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RELIANCE ON NONENFORCEMENT
ZACHARY S. PRICE*
ABSTRACT
Can regulated parties ever rely on official assurances that the law
will not apply to them? Recent marijuana and immigration non-
enforcement policies have presented this question in acute form. Both
policies effectively invited large numbers of legally unsophisticated
people to undertake significant legal risks in reliance on formally
nonbinding governmental assurances. The same question also arises
across a range of civil, criminal, and administrative contexts, and it
seems likely to recur in the future so long as partisan polarization
and sharp disagreement over the merits of existing law persist.
This Article addresses when, if ever, constitutional due process
principles may protect reliance on federal officials’ nonenforcement
assurances. The Article proposes that answering this question ulti-
mately requires balancing separation of powers costs against fairness
considerations. As a general matter, the balance tilts in favor of pre-
serving the enforceability of substantive prohibitions, so as to deny
executive officials de facto authority to cancel statutes by inviting
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reliance on promised nonenforcement. In certain circumstances,
however, particularly acute fairness concerns or limited separation
of powers costs support recognizing a reliance defense.
Courts have already recognized a limited anti-entrapment due
process defense in some cases in which enforcement officials mistak-
enly assure regulated parties that planned conduct is lawful. This
Article proposes that an analogous reliance defense should bar use
of information obtained in reliance on promised nonenforcement,
including information provided to the government in connection with
recent immigration programs; that other forms of indirect reliance,
such as providing facilities or services to formally illegal businesses,
should receive protection; that courts should sometimes protect
individuals’ reliance on congressionally mandated (rather than
agency-initiated) nonenforcement; and that longstanding persistence
of overt nonenforcement policies should eventually support a due
process defense of desuetude. The Article also suggests that Presi-
dents and Congresses in the future might seek to avoid risks of
unfairness created by nonenforcement policies by relying instead on
executive clemency, administrative measures, and legislative reforms
to moderate the scope of outdated or unpopular laws.
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INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, may private parties rely on official assurances that
federal law will not apply to them? This question arises in a
bewildering array of contexts, from humdrum to monumental. At
the most everyday level, federal park police might allow parking in
a particular spot only to return with a ticket, or harried Internal
Revenue Service personnel might provide mistaken guidance on
how to complete a tax return. More consequentially, federal law
enforcement and intelligence officials may enlist undercover agents
to join criminal operations as a means of uncovering crimes, some
federal agencies issue no-action letters and advisory opinions
indicating that planned conduct will not be punished, and a panoply
of administrative agencies issue enforcement policies indicating how
they plan to enforce the many detailed statutes and regulations they
administer. Such government assurances are often formally non-
binding—they indicate only what the government plans to do, not
what the law is—and yet at the same time they seem certain as a
practical matter to induce reliance. Indeed, in three administrative
law cases in the past five years, regulated parties have appeared
before the Supreme Court crying foul because of an agency’s
unexpected shift in enforcement practice.1
Recently, this question has arisen in still more acute form as a
result of two controversial enforcement policies, both approved at
the highest levels of government and now in doubt as a result of
Donald Trump’s election as President, which occured just as this
Article was going to press. First, in a series of guidance documents,
the U.S. Justice Department announced enforcement priorities
aimed at accommodating the increasing number of states that have
amended their own laws to legalize marijuana.2 Although possessing
1. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125-27 (2016); FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. (Fox II), 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317-18 (2012); Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2167 (2012).
2. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to All U.S. Attorneys (Feb. 14, 2014) [hereinafter 2014 Cole Financial Crimes Guidance],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-wdwa/ legacy/2014/02/14/DAG%20Memo%20-
%20Guidance%20Regarding%20Marijuana%20Related %20Financial%20Crimes%202%2014%
2014%20(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/E8X6-FN57]; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy
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(let alone distributing) marijuana remains a federal crime,3 the
Department of Justice guidance indicates that federal prosecutors
generally will not devote resources to enforcing federal narcotics
laws against parties operating in compliance with state law.4
Second, in two programs (one ultimately blocked by a preliminary
injunction5), the Department of Homeland Security invited broad
categories of undocumented immigrants to apply for “deferred
action,”6 a two- or three-year promise of nonremoval that entailed
eligibility for work authorization and other potential benefits.7 As
this Article was going to press, the incoming President’s exact plans
with respect to marijuana and immigration remained unclear, but
his sharp anti-immigration rhetoric during the campaign suggested
he might well choose to terminate the deferred action programs.8
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 2013
Cole Marijuana Enforcement Guidance], https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013
829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/PW6N-LD2G]; Memorandum from James M. Cole,
Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter
2011 Cole Medical Marijuana Guidance], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/ legacy/
2014/07/23/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf [https://perma. cc/NP5Q-3UN2];
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Selected
U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Ogden Marijuana Guidance], https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NWU-
QD8C].
3. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 841, 844 (2012).
4. See Ogden Marijuana Guidance, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
6. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.; Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting
Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t; & R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs &
Border Prot. (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter DAPA Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2UT-UZTK]; Memo-
randum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot.; Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs.; & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t (June 15, 2012)
[hereinafter DACA Memo], https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-
discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/67EL-EJB7].
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016); DAPA Memo, supra note 6, at 2.
8. See Jonathan Capehart, Why Millions Fear the Looming Trump Presidency, WASH.
POST: POST PARTISAN (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/
wp/2016/11/14/why-millions-fear-the-looming-trump-presidency/ [https://perma.cc/86W3-
9HCH] (noting that terminating DACA and DAPA is “No. 5 on Trump’s ‘10-point plan to put
America first’”).
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The marijuana and immigration policies raise difficult reliance
concerns because both policies, like other nonenforcement promises,
were formally nonbinding: the policy documents made clear that
they guaranteed nothing.9 Yet as a practical matter, both policies
effectively invited millions of people, many of them legally un-
sophisticated, to take significant legal risks. If the government
resumes enforcement, marijuana entrepreneurs could be guilty of
multiple federal crimes with stiff penalties,10 while deferred action
applicants will have provided the government with a removal case
“on a platter.”11 A dissenting Fifth Circuit judge even touted this
feature of the immigration programs as evidence of their validity:
[B]y encouraging removable aliens to self-identify and register,
both [deferred action programs] allow DHS to collect information
(names, addresses, etc.) that will make it easier to locate these
aliens in the future—if and when DHS ultimately decides to
remove them. DHS is, of course, a law enforcement agency, and
this is what we would call “good policing.”12
It seems doubtful, to put it mildly, that deferred action applicants
would have applied if they expected such use of their information;
nor is it plausible that marijuana entrepreneurs (let alone their
customers) expected federal officials to suddenly reverse course and
throw them in jail. A key question the policies raise, then, is
whether the detrimental reliance that these initiatives and other
similar policies invite should receive legal protection. Of course, the
government in the past has normally kept its promises so that no
question of reliance would arise. Yet the divisive recent election
gives us reason to worry that such informal good-government norms
may provide much weaker restraints in the future.13
9. See 2014 Cole Financial Crimes Guidance, supra note 2, at 3; 2013 Cole Marijuana
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at 4; 2011 Cole Medical Marijuana Guidance, supra note
2, at 2; Ogden Marijuana Guidance, supra note 2, at 3; DAPA Memo, supra note 6, at 5; DACA
Memo, supra note 6, at 3.
10. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844 (2012).
11. Mary D. Fan, Legalization Conflicts and Reliance Defenses, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 907,
939-40 (2015).
12. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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What is more, although any repudiation of President Obama’s
immigration policies will be a grave disappointment to many, re-
newed enforcement following executive assurances to the contrary
might be equally important in responding to Trump’s own
administration in the future. In accepting the Republican Party’s
presidential nomination, Trump pledged ominously that on the
day of his inauguration Americans would “wake up in a country
where the laws of the United States are enforced.”14 Notwithstand-
ing Trump’s posturing, however, the breadth of current federal
prohibitions makes extensive enforcement discretion inevitable in
any administration, and past Republican Presidents have used
nonenforcement to advance partisan policy objectives too.15 Nor is
it hard to imagine Trump or some other future Republican Presi-
dent adopting enforcement policies with respect to, say, gun control,
environmental protection, or tax compliance that a Democratic
successor would feel compelled to repudiate. Should any of these
possibilities come to pass, the reliance question addressed here will
arise in stark form, as indeed it already has in a series of cases
challenging the fairness of marijuana prosecutions in light of
announced federal enforcement policies.16
At present, this reliance question is governed by an untidy and
undertheorized set of cases holding that due process bars prosecu-
tion in some circumstances but not others.17 This Article offers an
account of this case law and proposes an organizing principle for the
doctrine. Although key decisions have often framed the issue in
14. Donald J. Trump, Republican Nomination Acceptance Speech at the Republican
National Convention (July 21, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/DJT_Acceptance_
Speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH3T-2GMY].
15. For my prior discussion of some examples, see Zachary S. Price, Politics of
Nonenforcement, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119, 1125-33 (2015).
16. See, e.g., Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 552 F. App’x 680, 683 (9th Cir.
2014); United States v. Canori, 737 F.3d 181, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2013); United States v. Trujillo,
No. CR-13-2109-FVS-1, 2014 WL 3697796, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 24, 2014); United States
v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Mont.), adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL
4602838 (D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012); Marin All. for Med. Marijuana v. Holder, 866 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1153-55 (N.D. Cal. 2011); cf. United States v. Rodriguez, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1291-92
(D.N.M. 2015) (reducing sentence for marijuana offense in light of executive enforcement
policy).
17. Compare Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 65-66
(1984), and Matamoros v. Grams, 706 F.3d 783, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2013), with United States
v. Pa. Indust. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973), and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 570-71 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959).
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terms of intuitive unfairness,18 in fact, reliance defenses require
balancing separation of powers concerns against considerations of
individual fair notice. On the one hand, protecting individual
reliance on promised nonenforcement would enable executive offi-
cials to wipe away substantive laws, a result that would defy the
basic separation of powers principle that executive officials can alter
substantive legal obligations only if Congress has delegated
authority to do so.19 On the other hand, failing to protect individual
reliance risks punishing individuals for conduct that they lacked
fair notice was subject to sanction.
On the whole, without quite framing the issue in these terms,
existing case law has struck this balance in favor of enforceability
and against individual reliance,20 while at the same time carving out
a narrow exception in some cases when enforcement officials invited
unlawful conduct with assurances of legality rather than mere
promises of nonenforcement.21 Federal courts thus have sometimes
protected reliance when official assurances involved at least an
apparent exercise of delegated interpretive authority to determine
legal meaning or when executive officials held authority to enlist
private parties in government operations not subject to generally
applicable legal prohibitions.22 In contrast, courts have generally
rejected reliance on promised nonenforcement—even when doing so
results in acute unfairness—when officials made no representation
that conduct was lawful and promised only to exercise their
discretion not to prosecute.23
18. See, e.g., PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674 (invoking “traditional notions of fairness inherent
in our system of criminal justice”); Raley, 360 U.S. at 438 (rejecting prosecution that would
“sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State”); United States v. Rampton,
762 F.3d 1152, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014) (describing due process as “rooted in conceptions of
fairness”); United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing defense to
prosecution based on “unfairness” of allowing government to proceed under the
circumstances); United States v. Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 468 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing the
entrapment by estoppel defense as “based upon fundamental notions of fairness embodied in
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution”); United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 714 (1st
Cir. 1991) (characterizing entrapment by estoppel defense as “predicated upon fundamental
notions of fairness embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause”).
19. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
20. See, e.g., Heckler, 467 U.S. at 60.
21. See, e.g., PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674; Cox, 379 U.S. at 570-71; Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39.
22. See PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674; Cox, 379 U.S. at 571; Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1095 (D. Mont.), adhered
to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 4602838 (D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012).
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Far from tracking any intuitive notion of fundamental fairness,
this pattern of case results ultimately tracks the important sep-
aration of powers principle, accepted even by most proponents of
broad nonenforcement policies, that enforcement discretion entails
authority to ignore completed violations but not to excuse future
ones. With the doctrine framed in these terms, I give it an uneasy
defense. Historically, executive authority to cancel legal prohibitions
was known as the “suspending” or “dispensing” power,24 and though
English monarchs exercised this authority, the Constitution
repudiates it by requiring that Presidents “faithfully execute[ ]”
federal laws.25 This anti-suspending rule—that, absent more specific
legislative delegation, executive officials have discretion over which
violations to pursue,26 but not over whether conduct violates the law
in the first place—forms an important constitutional background
principle against which Congress legislates. The principle preserves
ultimate legislative responsibility for the content of law (or at least
the scope of interpretive delegations to executive agencies), and it
enables creation of regulatory structures that leverage limited
enforcement resources to achieve broader societal compliance with
substantive law.
A broad reliance defense would undermine this separation of
powers principle by creating a legislatively unauthorized suspend-
ing power by operation of due process: executive officials could
eliminate legal prohibitions simply by inducing reliance on promised
nonenforcement. Courts have properly precluded this result by
cabining the contexts in which reliance will receive legal pro-
tection.27 To put the point most sharply, individuals who accept any
invitation by the President or executive officials to undertake illegal
conduct must do so at their peril. Due process cannot normally
shield them from future enforcement.
Yet if limits on reliance defenses thus advance separation of
powers values, framing reliance defenses in terms of a balance
between fair notice and separation of powers may help identify
24. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259, 278-79
(2009).
25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 567 (9th Cir. 2000).
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additional contexts, like cases involving mistaken assurances of
legality, in which the balance should tip the other way. This inquiry
carries the inevitable imprecision of all incommensurate balancing
tests: it involves, to some degree, assessing “whether a particular
line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”28 Nevertheless, I
suggest several types of cases in which more limited separation of
powers costs or more acute fairness concerns may justify broader
legal protection for reliance.
First, although courts have generally been more receptive to
reliance defenses in the criminal context, reliance defenses should
carry similar scope with respect to penal sanctions imposed through
civil or administrative processes. Second, broader reliance defenses
may be available when parties rely indirectly rather than directly
on nonenforcement assurances. In particular, due process principles
should thus protect reliance when—as in the Obama Administra-
tion’s immigration programs—parties rely by providing damning
information to government authorities, or when they violate
secondary legal prohibitions that exist mainly to reinforce primary
prohibitions that officials promised not to enforce. Third, reliance
defenses may carry broader scope when Congress, rather than the
executive branch alone, prescribes nonenforcement by denying
funding for federal enforcement, as it has done recently with respect
to prosecution of state-authorized medical marijuana businesses.
And finally, longstanding overt nonenforcement policies might
eventually give rise to a desuetude defense against future retrospec-
tive enforcement.
Beyond my particular doctrinal proposals, I also suggest here that
both Congress and the President might make a more deliberate
effort to avoid catching regulated parties, particularly parties as
unsuspecting and sympathetic as marijuana entrepreneurs and
undocumented immigrants, in the crossfire of future battles over
enforcement policy.29 Presidents might do so in appropriate cases
28. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing a balancing test as applied to the dormant Commerce
Clause).
29. I have addressed questions regarding executive nonenforcement in two previous
articles: Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671,
748-50 (2014) [hereinafter Price, Enforcement Discretion]; Zachary S. Price, Law Enforcement
as Political Question, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1571, 1622-24 (2016) [hereinafter Price, Law
Enforcement as Political Question]. For citations to other scholarship addressing related
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through constitutional clemency powers or delegated administrative
authorities, and Congress, of course, may amend underlying laws
themselves.
As a preliminary caveat regarding scope, I concentrate here on
nonenforcement of federal laws governing private conduct through
imposition of penal sanctions. I thus hold aside the important
question, which I hope to address separately in the future, of how
due process defenses may apply to self-dealing government policies,
that is, policies that excuse illegality by government agents them-
selves, whether by deeming governing statutes inapplicable or
unconstitutional or simply as a matter of nonenforcement.30 Nor do
I address here other theories, such as selective prosecution on
political or racial grounds, that might constrain an administration’s
enforcement options with respect to marijuana, immigration, or
other areas of law following a period of promised nonenforcement.
I also concentrate here on federal rather than state law. Some key
due process cases discussed below address due process violations by
state officials, and the same basic balance is likely implicated in any
system of law enforcement involving separated legislative and
executive powers. Nevertheless, in principle, states might choose to
strike the balance differently by granting narrower or broader scope
to executive enforcement discretion, and narrower or broader scope
to resulting reliance interests. In fact, as addressed briefly below,
state courts have taken a variety of approaches to estoppel claims
asserted against state governments.31 
My analysis proceeds as follows. I begin in Part I with a brief
account of the Supreme Court’s pertinent case law to date, followed
by a discussion of how the marijuana and immigration policies in
particular, and trends toward political polarization and presidential
administration more generally, have placed pressure on existing
doctrine. Part II then offers a normative defense of current doctrine
and its limitations in terms of the balancing framework I have
questions, see infra notes 86 and 136.
30. The most notorious recent example of such self-dealing interpretation is the Office of
Legal Counsel’s withdrawn opinion deeming statutory prohibitions on torture unconsti-
tutional. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 31 (Aug. 1, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/olc/
file/886061/download [https://perma.cc/437E-C7Z4].
31. See infra Part II.B.4.
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proposed. Part II also briefly rebuts competing proposals. Part III
then addresses additional contexts in which due process principles
might support a reliance defense, and Part IV identifies benefits of
employing presidential clemency or substantive legal reforms rather
than nonenforcement. The Article ends with a conclusion summariz-
ing the overall argument.
I. FRAMING THE PROBLEM
Fair notice of what conduct will incur sanctions is a basic aspect
of due process.32 The Constitution thus protects individuals’ reliance
on the legality of their conduct at the time it is undertaken.33 But in
a world in which few laws are fully enforced and enforcement
discretion is pervasive, enforcement choices may be as significant as
formal law in determining on-the-ground perceptions of legality. In
particular contexts, furthermore, enforcement officials may provide
specific indications about how the law will be enforced, or even what
the law is. Does due process ever protect reliance on expectations
formed by such government actions?
To date, the Supreme Court has directly addressed this question
principally in a perplexing and undertheorized trilogy of cases from
over forty years ago.34 The questions addressed in these cases, how-
ever, have gained new importance as a result of controversial
federal nonenforcement policies relating to marijuana and immigra-
tion35—policies that are now very much in doubt given Donald
Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election. At the same time,
the increasingly polarized and erratic character of our politics gives
reason to fear that similar questions will continue to arise, in these
or other areas of law. 
32. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994) (“Elementary con-
siderations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the
law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly
disrupted.”).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959).
35. See 2014 Cole Financial Crimes Guidance, supra note 2, at 1-2; 2013 Cole Marijuana
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at 1-2; 2011 Cole Medical Marijuana Guidance, supra
note 2, at 2; Ogden Marijuana Guidance, supra note 2, at 1; DAPA Memo, supra note 6, at 2,
4; DACA Memo, supra note 6, at 1-2.
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A. Existing Doctrine
Under current doctrine, as reflected in the age-old maxim that
“ignorance of the law is no excuse,” misapprehension of governing
law generally provides no defense against enforcement.36 The
Supreme Court thus has generally resisted protecting reliance on
mistaken assurances about the law or its application. In particular,
the Court has repeatedly rejected arguments that the government
may be estopped from recovering benefits overpayments or other-
wise correcting legal errors simply because regulated parties relied
to their detriment on federal officials’ guidance.37 Nevertheless, in
three decisions between 1959 and 1973, the Court established that
due process may sometimes bar criminal enforcement following such
mistaken official assurances.
The seminal case for this due process defense is Raley v. Ohio.38
There, the Court overturned state law convictions of several
witnesses who refused to answer a state legislative commission’s
questions about alleged Communist Party activity.39 Without any
apparent objection by the commission, the witnesses asserted a
privilege against self-incrimination under the U.S. and Ohio Consti-
tutions, even though in fact a state immunity statute precluded use
of their statements in subsequent criminal proceedings (thus
arguably obviating the privilege).40 “[T]o sustain [the convictions] ...
after the Commission had acted as it did,” Justice Brennan’s major-
ity opinion thundered, “would be to sanction the most indefensible
sort of entrapment by the State—convicting a citizen for exercising
a privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to
him.”41 Hence, even though the state’s high court deemed the
36. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (rejecting view that “a
defendant must know that his conduct is illegal before he may be found guilty” because “[t]he
familiar maxim ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ typically holds true”); Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014) (“[A]n individual generally cannot escape criminal
liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law.”).
37. See, e.g., Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63-64
(1984); see also Matamoros v. Grams, 706 F.3d 783, 793-94 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting case law
and observing that the Supreme Court has never affirmed a holding of equitable estoppel
against the government and has reversed every such holding it has reviewed).
38. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
39. Id. at 442.
40. Id. at 426-32.
41. Id. at 438.
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Commission’s implicit assurances legally erroneous, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that such “active misleading” by “the voice of
the State most presently speaking to the [witnesses]” at the hearing
violated due process.42
The Court’s second case in this line, Cox v. Louisiana, extended
Raley’s due process principle to overturn disorderly conduct
convictions of protesters who demonstrated across the street from
a state courthouse.43 Although the state statute in question pro-
hibited protests “in or near” a court building, senior police officials
evidently granted the protesters permission to demonstrate in the
location they chose.44 Quoting Raley, the Court again found “an
indefensible sort of entrapment by the State” in punishing the
protesters for conduct the state itself appeared to authorize.45
Finally, in United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical
Corp. (PICCO), the Court overturned a criminal conviction under
federal environmental statutes because the district court prevented
the defendant from presenting evidence that it relied on an
executive agency’s “longstanding administrative construction” of the
statute in question.46 Citing Raley and Cox, the Court emphasized
that the defendant wished to show “it was affirmatively misled by
the responsible administrative agency into believing that the law
did not apply in this situation.”47 The Court agreed that the
defendant “had a right to look to the [agency’s] regulations for guid-
ance.”48 The Court explained:
[The regulations’] designed purpose was to guide persons as to
the meaning and requirements of the statute. Thus, to the
extent that the regulations deprived [the defendant] of fair
warning as to what conduct the Government intended to make
criminal, we think there can be no doubt that traditional notions
42. Id. at 438-39. The Court divided evenly as to one defendant who a plurality believed
did not rely on the privilege in refusing to answer certain questions. Id.
43. 379 U.S. 559, 568-69 (1965).
44. Id. at 560.
45. Id. at 571 (quoting Raley, 360 U.S. at 426).
46. 411 U.S. 655, 657 (1973).
47. Id. at 673-74.
48. Id. at 674.
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of fairness inherent in our system of criminal justice prevent the
Government from proceeding with the prosecution.49
As discussed further below, lower courts have generally construed
these three decisions narrowly.50 Though the Raley-Cox-PICCO
trilogy might suggest that any misleading assurances by executive
officials potentially support a due process defense, courts have
generally understood them to limit nonenforcement only in closely
analogous circumstances.51 Yet recent marijuana and immigration
enforcement policies, adopted against a backdrop of partisan
polarization and sharp disagreement over existing law, have given
new importance to questions regarding any due process reliance
defense.
B. Marijuana and Immigration
1. The Policies
Because they constitute important current case studies, and be-
cause they may well augur future trends, some background on the
Obama Administration’s marijuana and immigration policies is
appropriate here. Importantly, both policies arose against the
backdrop of widespread underenforcement of the applicable federal
substantive laws. According to the law on the books, distributing
and possessing marijuana are federal crimes.52 Marijuana posses-
sion may also constitute a predicate for conspiracy or racketeering
crimes.53 In practice, however, the federal government rarely
pursued low-level marijuana offenses, preferring instead to focus
limited investigative and prosecutorial resources on terrorism,
financial crimes, large-scale drug trafficking, and myriad other
offenses that implicate stronger federal interests or pose greater
public safety threats.54
49. Id.
50. See infra Part III.A.
51. See, e.g., Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61
(1984).
52. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 841, 844 (2012).
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) (2012); 21 U.S.C. §§ 847, 848.
54. See Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
89 DENV. U. L. REV. 997, 1002-03 (2012); Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Mari-
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Similarly, entering the United States without inspection by im-
migration officials is also a federal crime,55 and immigrants in the
United States without lawful authorization are generally subject to
removal.56 Employers, moreover, are generally barred from employ-
ing such immigrants.57 Immigrants may also commit a federal
misdemeanor by failing to register with the federal government or
carry proof of status.58 Yet these harsh restrictions, too, have often
been obeyed in the breach. Due to longstanding unauthorized
migration and equally longstanding failures of enforcement, roughly
eleven million formally removable immigrants reside in the United
States, many of them now well integrated into local communities
and performing important social and economic roles.59 During the
Obama Administration, the government estimated that with avail-
able resources it could remove at most four hundred thousand of
these eleven million each year.60
Facing mounting political pressure to conform these outdated
laws to current social realities, the Obama Administration took bold
measures to reduce the effective risk of enforcement. Political con-
flict over federal marijuana policy became acute as increasing
numbers of states relaxed state restrictions on marijuana possession
and use.61 Though state reforms initially applied to only medical
marijuana, several states have now legalized recreational use of the
drug.62 The U.S. Justice Department responded to these developments
juana and the Persistence of Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, 65
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 774-75 (2015).
55. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012).
56. Id. § 1227(a)(1).
57. Id. § 1324a(a).
58. Id. §§ 1304(e), 1306(a).
59. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 107, 129-32 (2015) (discussing history of recent migration,
immigrant employment, and federal enforcement).
60. See The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38
Op. O.L.C. (Nov. 19, 2014) (mem. op. at 1) [hereinafter OLC Immigration Opinion], https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-
prioritize-removal.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 72C5-UTQ6].
61. See Fan, supra note 11, at 929-31.
62. See id. at 925-26. In November 2016, voters in four additional states, including
California, approved measures to legalize recreational marijuana use as a matter of state law.
Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Reform Went 8 for 9 on the Ballot This Week. It Could Be
the Tipping Point., WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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with a series of memoranda to U.S. Attorneys that establish federal
priorities for marijuana enforcement and effectively eliminate risks
of enforcement outside those priorities.63 Initially, in 2009, the
Deputy Attorney General issued guidance to U.S. Attorneys di-
recting them not to focus prosecutorial resources on “individuals
whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”64
Roughly a year and a half later, new guidance clarified that large-
scale growing operations remained subject to prosecution and that
U.S. Attorneys should evaluate all possible prosecutions on a case-
by-case basis.65
Finally, in 2013, following legalization of recreational marijuana
in Colorado and Washington, the Justice Department issued a new
memorandum to U.S. Attorneys identifying specified priorities for
federal marijuana enforcement and indicating that prosecution
would not otherwise be a priority, provided the states maintained
“strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems.”66 The
Administration later followed up with a further memo indicating
that prosecution of marijuana-related financial crimes, such as
money laundering and failure to report certain transactions, should
track the same priorities applied to marijuana violations them-
selves.67
The Obama Administration’s approach to immigration enforce-
ment followed a similar pattern of escalating assurances of
nonenforcement. Facing mounting pressure from immigrant ad-
vocates for legal reform, the Administration urged Congress to
provide lawful status for otherwise law-abiding undocumented
news/wonk/wp/2016/11/10/marijuana-reform-went-8-for-9-on-the-ballot-this-week-it-could-be-
the-tipping-point/ [https://perma.cc/VK68-Q87K] (discussing ballot measures legalizing recrea-
tional marijuana use in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada).
63. See 2013 Cole Marijuana Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2.
64. Ogden Marijuana Guidance, supra note 2, at 2.
65. See 2011 Cole Medical Marijuana Guidance, supra note 2, at 1-2.
66. 2013 Cole Marijuana Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2, at 2.
67. See 2014 Cole Financial Crimes Guidance, supra note 2; see also Fin. Crimes Enf’t
Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FIN-2014-G001, BSA Expectations Regarding
Marijuana-Related Businesses (Feb. 14, 2014) (clarifying bank reporting obligations with
respect to marijuana-related transactions); Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Dir., Exec.
Office for U.S. Attorneys, to All U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 28, 2014) (extending same priorities to
marijuana enforcement in Indian country).
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immigrants.68 At the same time, in the so-called Morton Memoran-
dum, the Administration adopted enforcement priorities, akin to its
marijuana guidance, that focused enforcement efforts on criminals
and new entrants rather than the longtime undocumented.69 Amid
increasing partisanship and political polarization over immigration,
however, reform efforts in Congress ultimately failed. Congress
failed even to provide relief for DREAMers—immigrants who
entered the United States as young children and grew up as law-
abiding Americans with no other home.70 The Morton Memorandum,
meanwhile, failed to significantly shift enforcement patterns, a
result some attributed to resistance within the enforcement bu-
reaucracy.71
In this context, the Administration took a bolder approach,
establishing programs to provide “deferred action” to large catego-
ries of undocumented immigrants. “Deferred action” is formally
nothing more than a temporary decision, subject to reconsideration
at any time, not to seek an immigrant’s removal.72 In that sense, it
amounts to an exercise of enforcement discretion, and immigration
authorities have offered it to immigrants on an ad hoc basis for
decades.73 Under applicable regulations, however, granting deferred
action may render immigrants eligible for work authorization and
other benefits.74 In practice, moreover, deferred action may amount
to an effective reprieve from any meaningful risk of deportation.
In a first program announced in June 2012, Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), the Department of Homeland Security
invited certain immigrants who entered the United States as young
children and met other specified criteria to apply for two-year
68. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM (2011),
https://perma.cc/VJL3-ENSR (offering comprehensive “blueprint” for immigration reform,
including passage of legislative relief for many undocumented immigrants).
69. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field
Office Dirs. (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo], https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-
communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q536-LDBF].
70. See Jeffrey Toobin, American Limbo, NEW YORKER (July 27, 2015), http://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2015/07/27/american-limbo [https://perma.cc/YG6L-L9R2].
71. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 59, at 136-37.
72. See OLC Immigration Opinion, supra note 60, at 12-19.
73. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 245, 248 (2010).
74. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2016).
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renewable grants of deferred action.75 Two and a half years later, in
November 2014, the Department announced a second program,
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA), that opened
deferred action applications to a much larger group.76 Under DAPA,
most immigrants who were parents of U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, and who were not otherwise priorities for removal, could
apply for deferred action.77 DAPA, moreover, expanded eligibility
criteria for DACA and extended grants of deferred action under both
programs to three years.78
Congress’s response to these various initiatives was mixed.
Responding to shifting public attitudes toward marijuana, Congress
repeatedly enacted an appropriations rider barring use of Justice
Department funds “to prevent [listed states] from implementing
their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana.”79 Proposed substantive legal
reforms, however, failed to gain traction at the federal level,
although ballot measures in November 2016 legalized medical or
recreational marijuana as a matter of state law in several additional
states.80
Immigration politics, meanwhile, grew increasingly toxic.
Although Congress failed to stymie either DACA or DAPA directly
during President Obama’s tenure (in part because both were funded
with user fees rather than ongoing appropriations), Republican
politicians and presidential candidates railed against the programs
in increasingly vituperative terms.81 Texas and roughly two dozen
other states successfully sued to enjoin DAPA (though not DACA).82
75. DACA Memo, supra note 6.
76. DAPA Memo, supra note 6.
77. Id. at 4.
78. Id.
79. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242,
2332-33 (2015); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (including similar restriction); see also Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-53, § 103, 129 Stat. 502, 506 (2015) (extending force
of § 538 with respect to continuing appropriations).
80. See Ingraham, supra note 62 (discussing successful measures to legalize recreational
marijuana use in California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada and medical use in
Arkansas, Florida, Montana, and North Dakota).
81. See Toobin, supra note 70.
82. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
956 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:937
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s preliminary injunction
halting DAPA, and the Supreme Court in turn affirmed the Fifth
Circuit by an equally divided vote, thus leaving the preliminary
injunction in place through the end of Obama’s presidency.83
Incoming President Donald Trump, meanwhile, pledged at times
during his campaign to deport all eleven million unauthorized
immigrants from the United States.84 While it remained unclear as
this Article was going to press precisely what enforcement policy
President Trump would adopt with respect to either marijuana or
immigration, it appeared likely that his Administration would
terminate DACA and DAPA.85
2. Questions of Authority, the Rule of Law, and Reliance
Legal controversy over the Obama marijuana and immigration
policies centered on questions of legal authority. Critics, including
the challengers in the Texas litigation, charged that one or both of
these policies surpassed limits on what can be done to change on-
the-ground law through enforcement discretion.86 Relatedly, the
policies’ supporters and opponents debated whether exercising
enforcement discretion in such overt and deliberate ways under-
mined or advanced rule-of-law values.87
83. Id.
84. Julia Preston et al., What Would It Take for Donald Trump to Deport 11 Million and
Build a Wall?, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/20/us/politics/
donald-trump-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/8NSQ-KV2C].
85. See supra note 8.
86. For a sampling of scholarly articles defending or questioning one or both policies, see,
for example, Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (2013);
Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661 (2015); Cox &
Rodríguez, supra note 59; Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care
Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and
the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (2014); Peter Margulies, The Boundaries
of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful Presence, and Immigration Law, 64 AM. U.
L. REV. 1183 (2015); Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the Traditions of
Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2015); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash,
Response, The Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 115 (2013); Price,
Enforcement Discretion, supra note 29; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1285 (2015).
87. For challenges to one or both policies on rule-of-law grounds, see, for example, DAVID
E. BERNSTEIN, LAWLESS: THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S UNPRECEDENTED ASSAULT ON THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2015); Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA
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Yet the policies also raise another vexing question that has
received less attention, but could now arise in stark form: What
protection should the law give to detrimental reliance on these
policies? In doctrinal terms, can some theory rooted in Raley, Cox,
and PICCO provide protection—or, if not, should these cases be
reconsidered?
Whether or not DACA, DAPA, and the marijuana guidance are
lawful or appropriate exercises of executive authority, as a practical
matter millions of people—many of them legally unsophisticated
and unlikely to have parsed the fine print—have made potentially
catastrophic personal decisions based on perceived assurances
contained in these policies. Indeed, considering the legal questions
surrounding the programs, the extent of private parties’ reliance is
remarkable.
For example, by some estimates marijuana is now at least a $700
million industry in Colorado alone.88 Operating a business to sell
marijuana is nevertheless a serious federal crime. Not only does
each transaction violate the Controlled Substances Act,89 but buyers
and sellers alike could be charged with participating in a criminal
“enterprise” under the Controlled Substances Act or Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).90 At the very least,
the business constitutes a narcotics conspiracy, one that might even
encompass government officials involved in licensing and regulating
Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213 (2015); Senator Ted Cruz,
The Obama Administration’s Unprecedented Lawlessness, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63
(2015); Ken Paxton, The President Must Respect the Rule of Law, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 11, 2015,
4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/415209/president-must-respect-rule-law-ken-
paxton [https://perma.cc/U24V-QK2F]. For defenses, see, for example, Cox & Rodríguez, supra
note 59; Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of
Law Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58 (2015). For
some reflections on this aspect of the debate, see Zachary S. Price, Seeking Baselines for
Negative Authority: Constitutional and Rule-of-Law Arguments Over Nonenforcement and
Waiver, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 235 (2016); see also Merrill, supra note 86, at 1965, 1977
(discussing competing conceptions of the rule of law at play in current debates).
88. See Christopher Ingraham, Colorado’s Legal Weed Market: $700 Million in Sales Last
Year, $1 Billion by 2016, WASH. POST: WONKBLOG (Feb. 12, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/02/12/colorados-legal-weed-market-700-million-in-sales-last-
year-1-billion-by-2016/ [https://perma.cc/LK3F-G3NA].
89. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(c), 841, 844 (2012).
90. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1960-1961 (2012) (establishing criminal penalties for participating
in a racketeering enterprise); 21 U.S.C. § 848 (imposing mandatory minimum twenty-year
sentence on certain participants in narcotics-related “continuing criminal enterprise[s]”).
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its operation and collecting tax revenue from it.91 Although the
general five-year statute of limitations for federal crimes affords
some protection against prosecution for offenses long in the past,92
the limitations period for ongoing offenses will begin running only
when the offense terminates.93
For the time being, the appropriations rider noted earlier pre-
vents enforcement with respect to medical marijuana. Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit recently held that individual criminal defendants may
invoke the appropriations restrictions as a defense to prosecution.94
Yet the riders manifestly do not reach recreational marijuana
businesses like those in Colorado.95 Meanwhile, several additional
states, including California, legalized marijuana’s recreational use
91. The Controlled Substances Act specifically exempts from its scope enforcement
activities by both federal and state officials:
Except as provided in [certain other provisions], no civil or criminal liability
shall be imposed by virtue of this subchapter upon any duly authorized Federal
officer lawfully engaged in the enforcement of this subchapter, or upon any duly
authorized officer of any State, territory, political subdivision thereof, the
District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States, who shall be
lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating
to controlled substances.
21 U.S.C. § 885(d). Early in California’s marijuana legalization adventure, Oakland city
officials creatively sought to exempt an officially designated marijuana dispensary from
federal controlled substances restrictions by claiming that dispensary officials were effectively
“enforcing” municipal drug laws. See United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.
2006). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. Id. Agreeing with the district court, it wrote
that “‘enforcement’ means ‘to compel compliance with the law.... At best, [the dispensary’s
executive] was implementing or facilitating the purpose of the statute; he was not compelling
anyone to do or not to do anything.’” Id. (quoting Rosenthal, 266 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1078 (N.D.
Cal. 2003)).
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282.
93. See, e.g., id. § 1961(5) (defining “pattern of racketeering activity” for RICO purposes
to include acts ten years apart); Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 719-20 (2013)
(explaining that limitations period for conspiracy violations begins running only when the
individual defendant withdraws from the conspiracy); United States v. Bostick, 791 F.3d 127,
140-41 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that only the most recent predicate act of a continuing
criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. § 848 need occur within limitations period), cert. denied
sub nom. Edelin v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 184 (2016) (mem.). With respect to immigration,
the five-year limitations period generally prevents long-delayed criminal prosecution for
illegal entry or reentry, but no such limit applies to the civil remedy of removal. See generally
Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1257 (2014).
94. United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2016).
95. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242,
2332-33 (2015) (barring use of funds only with respect to “medical marijuana”).
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through successful ballot initiatives in November 2016.96 Outside
the scope of the riders, individuals buying and selling marijuana in
compliance with state law, or even licensing and taxing it as
required by state law, have relied exclusively on the Justice Depart-
ment’s stated intention to look the other way.97
Reliance interests implicated by DACA and DAPA are equally
significant. To apply for deferred action under the programs,
immigrants provided a range of documentation, including informa-
tion about when they arrived in the United States and where they
currently live.98 Were the government to deny or cancel deferred
action, this information would provide immigration authorities with
a removal case “on a platter.”99 For this reason, although over
700,000 immigrants received deferred action through DACA,100 some
immigration attorneys questioned whether to advise clients to
apply.101 DHS’s official responses regarding the program naturally
included assurances that application information would not be
provided to enforcement authorities—but the guidance indicated in
the same breath that these assurances were nonbinding and subject
to change.102
In addition to providing the information required to apply,
moreover, deferred action recipients may well have lived more
openly in reliance on the government’s promises. At the least, they
96. See supra note 62.
97. Cf. United States v. Silkeutsabay, No. 13-CR-0140-TOR-1, 2015 WL 2376170, at *1-2
(E.D. Wash. May 18, 2015) (rejecting application of rider when conduct was not in compliance
with state law).
98. See DAPA Memo, supra note 6, at 4; DACA Memo, supra note 6, at 1; Frequently
Asked Questions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions [https://
perma.cc/S6G2-3D8M] [hereinafter DACA FAQs] (updated June 15, 2015).
99. Fan, supra note 11, at 940.
100. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., NUMBER OF I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF
DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS BY FISCAL YEAR, QUARTER, INTAKE, BIOMETRICS
AND CASE STATUS: 2012-2016 (MARCH 31) (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ files/
USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20Form%
20Types/DACA/I821d_performancedata_fy2016_qtr2.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7WJ-PVNA];
Julia Preston & Jennifer Medina, Immigrants Who Came to U.S. as Children Fear Deporta-
tion Under Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/us/
immigrants-donald-trump-daca.html [https://perma.cc/VCU8-3VYQ].
101. Fan, supra note 11, at 939.
102. See DACA FAQs, supra note 98.
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could work lawfully, pay taxes, and receive other legal benefits.103
As President Obama stated when announcing DAPA, deferred
action carried the promise that those who “me[t] the criteria” could
“come out of the shadows and get right with the law.”104 But
immigrants subject to removal were in the shadows for a reason. In
other contexts, encouraging individuals engaged in unlawful
conduct to expose themselves may be “good policing,” as the Fifth
Circuit dissent put it,105 but it seems doubtful that immigrants
would have taken this risk without the perceived assurance that
doing so would place them at reduced, rather than increased, risk
of future enforcement.
C. A Dark Future?
Among many fears surrounding the incoming Trump Administra-
tion is concern about whether and how he may adjust current
executive enforcement policies, a question that remained unan-
swered as this Article was going to press. Increasing state-level
support for marijuana liberalization might provide political
protection for state-authorized marijuana businesses, but immi-
gration is another matter. Having promised at times to seek
deportation of all unauthorized migrants in the United States,106
Trump appears likely to increase enforcement in some way, though
many hope he will not go as far as he promised during the cam-
paign.107
In any event, whatever the fate of these particular policies, the
very forces of polarization and partisan disagreement that gave rise
to them may well lead to other similar policies, perhaps in quite
different areas of law. As Kate Andrias has argued, the marijuana
and immigration policies reflect a trend across recent administra-
tions towards “presidential enforcement,” meaning increasingly
overt, deliberate, and centrally directed use of enforcement as a
103. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 59, at 217; see also Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d
134, 147-49 (5th Cir. 2015), aff ’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 227 (2016).
104. Full Text: Obama’s Immigration Speech, USA TODAY (Nov. 21, 2014, 8:45 AM), http://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/20/obama-immigration-full-remarks/70030636/
[https://perma.cc/LJ5K-2GNP] [hereinafter Obama DAPA Speech].
105. Texas, 809 F.3d at 191 (King, J., dissenting).
106. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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policy tool.108 Much as Presidents have asserted greater control over
regulatory policy through so-called presidential administration, so
too have they exercised increasingly centralized control over
enforcement, with a view towards achieving political goals and
gaining favor with key constituencies.109 
Much like presidential administration itself, enforcement policy
on this account may become more responsive to political pressures
and thus more accountable, but by the same token it may also
become more politically driven.110 Historically, as the examples of
marijuana and immigration enforcement demonstrate, a certain
political economy has often governed executive enforcement.111
Presidents have soft-pedaled unpopular laws (or at least laws their
constituents disfavor), while prosecutors and administrative agen-
cies have normally exercised their discretion to protect reliance on
their informal assurances, whether or not due process required
them to do so.112 Yet if enforcement becomes more politicized, as it
did during the 2016 presidential campaign, and if Presidents
continue to exercise enforcement policy in a salient fashion on
politically contested issues, then there may well be greater risk that
implicit good-governance norms that have generally prevented
sharp reversals will break down. A future administration with
different partisan preferences might then choose to reverse course,
perhaps even with respect to conduct openly tolerated by a past
administration—precisely as Trump might choose to do with respect
to immigration.113
At any rate, the very example the marijuana and immigration
policies have set may increase the likelihood of similar policies in
other contested areas. To highlight just one example, a number of
states have adopted gun freedom statutes purporting to authorize
108. Andrias, supra note 86, at 1034-35, 1066-67.
109. Id. at 1064, 1069; see also Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 29, at 687.
110. For further reflections on this development, see Price, supra note 15, at 1139-40.
111. See Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 29, at 757-61.
112. Michael Asimow found in a survey conducted in the early 1970s that agencies
generally protected “justifiable reliance interest[s]” with respect to even nonbinding agency
advice. MICHAEL ASIMOW, ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
7-8, 30-31 (1973).
113. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Julia Preston, What Donald Trump’s Vow to Deport up to 3
Million Immigrants Would Mean, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
11/15/us/politics/donald-trump-deport-immigrants.html [https://perma.cc/H5X3-ZNFD].
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local gun manufacturing and sales in defiance of federal law.114
Whereas the Obama Administration (quite properly) asserted the
supremacy of federal law and threatened federal enforcement to
shut down such state-level efforts, a gun-friendly Trump Adminis-
tration might choose the opposite course.115 Nor is it hard to imagine
aggressive uses of nonenforcement in contested areas such as tax
law, environmental regulation, or healthcare, even if for the time
being unified party control of the presidency and both Houses of
Congress also makes substantial legislative reform possible.116
Reliance questions, in short, could be just as salient in the after-
math of Trump’s presidency as in weighing the effects of Obama’s
policies.
At any rate, questions of fair notice and reliance have already
arisen in some marijuana prosecutions, prompting one judge to
comment openly on the apparent unfairness of proceeding against
defendants confused by shifting official pronouncements.117 Private
parties, moreover, may well file civil suits against marijuana
businesses under federal racketeering statutes based on alleged
criminal violations.118 And questions of reliance in administrative
114. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 44.99.500 (2015); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3114 (2016);
IDAHO CODE § 18-3315A (2016); Second Amendment Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-
1201 to -1211 (2016); Montana Firearms Freedom Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-20-101 to -106
(2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-35-2 (2016); Tennessee Firearms Freedom Act, TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-54-102 to -106 (2016); Utah State-Made Firearms Protection Act, UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 53-5b-101 to -202 (LexisNexis 2016); Wyoming Firearms Freedom Act, WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6-8-401 to -406 (2016).
115. For a description of the federal response to one such state law and rejection of
constitutional arguments against its preemption, see Mont. Shooting Sports Ass’n v. Holder,
727 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2013). For general discussion of these laws, see Fan, supra note
11, at 932-35.
116. For examples of past Republican administrations’ use of nonenforcement to advance
deregulatory objectives, see Andrias, supra note 86, at 1057-63; Price, supra note 15, at 1125-
33.
117. See United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Mont.) (“[T]he words
of federal officials were enough to convince those who were considering entry into the medical
marijuana business that they could engage in that enterprise without fear of federal criminal
consequences.”), adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 4602838 (D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012).
118. See Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach
to Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 649-56 (2011) (discussing this
possibility). At least one such suit concluded in a settlement. See Ricardo Baca, Anti-Pot
Racketeering Suit Settles, Opens Door for Future RICO Claims, DENV. POST (Dec. 30, 2015,
10:48 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/12/30/anti-pot-racketeering-suit-settles-opens-
door-for-future-rico-claims/ [https://perma.cc/6YAX-5P9B].
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contexts have arisen with significant frequency in recent Supreme
Court litigation.119
For all these reasons, the due process reliance defense recognized
by the Supreme Court a half century ago merits another look. To
date, however, although extensive scholarship has addressed
questions of executive authority120 and federalism,121 to my knowl-
edge only one scholar has focused directly on questions of reliance.122
This scholar’s approach, moreover, differs from my own for reasons
addressed below.123 My analysis here thus aims to add an important
new dimension to burgeoning debates over nonenforcement.
II. A BALANCING FRAMEWORK
For all the Supreme Court’s bluster in Raley, Cox, and PICCO
about “active misleading,” fundamental fairness, and “indefensible”
treatment,124 reliance on nonenforcement in fact implicates a
complicated tradeoff between fundamentally incommensurate
concerns. On the one hand, allowing executive officials’ assurances
to disable future enforcement would undermine basic separation of
powers limits on executive authority: Executive officials could
change substantive legal obligations without adequate delegated
authority to do so. On the other hand, as the marijuana and
immigration examples starkly illustrate, regulated parties may be
quite likely as a practical matter to rely on even formally nonbind-
ing policies and promises.125 As a result, from the individual’s
perspective at least, enforcement in defiance of such assurances may
seem to violate basic notions of fair warning, or at least fair dealing,
that form an important component of constitutional due process.126
119. See infra Part II.A.3.
120. See supra notes 86-87.
121. See, e.g., William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 65
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 513 (2015); Mikos, supra note 54, at 997; Young, supra note 54, at 772-
73.
122. See generally Fan, supra note 11.
123. See infra Part II.B.2.
124. See supra Part I.A.
125. See supra Part I.B.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Mont.) (“[T]here
is a strongly held belief among those in the medical marijuana community that the federal
government has not treated them fairly.”), adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 4602838
(D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012).
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 Framing the doctrine in these terms—as a balance between fair
notice and separation of powers—better explains the pattern of
current case law than the nebulous notions of fairness and reason-
ableness that courts have tended to invoke.127 In fact, the doctrine
as it stands permits quite stark unfairness in many cases, but that
is because separation of powers limits on executive authority cannot
otherwise be protected. The doctrine, in effect, must often sacrifice
individual defendants’ reliance to acheive separation of powers
compliance. From this perspective, the specific holdings of Raley,
Cox, and PICCO are justified, but lower courts have correctly
understood these decisions to protect reliance only in narrow
circumstances in which the balance plausibly tips in favor of fair-
ness rather than separation of powers.
In Part III, I will turn to identifying additional contexts where the
trade-offs between fairness and separation of powers may support
protecting reliance.128 Here, I elaborate on this tentative defense of
current doctrine and rebut recent calls for a broader reliance
defense.
A. The Basic Doctrine Defended and Refined
1. General Rule
As a general matter, when it comes to reliance on nonenforce-
ment, the balance between separation of powers limits and fairness
considerations must favor the former over the latter, even at the
risk of egregious unfairness in some cases. That is so because
fundamental, constitutionally based limits on executive authority
would otherwise be obliterated.
Within the federal constitutional scheme, current doctrine gives
Congress broad authority to delegate effective lawmaking power to
executive agencies.129 Under the familiar doctrine of “Chevron
deference,” moreover, courts treat ambiguities in agency-adminis-
tered statutes as delegations of interpretive discretion to the
agency.130 Nevertheless, absent some such delegation of lawmaking
127. See infra Part II.A.2.
128. See infra Part III.
129. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473-75 (2001).
130. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
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authority, executive officials hold discretion only with respect to how
the law is enforced, not over what the law requires in the first place.
At some point, even in administrative contexts, ambiguity gives out
and the obligation to execute the law as written kicks in. Accord-
ingly, although resource constraints and practical challenges often
preclude anything close to full enforcement of federal laws, execu-
tive enforcement discretion is nonetheless subject to the ultimate
outer limit that executive officials lack authority to change legal
obligations by licensing violations ahead of time. As the Supreme
Court recently observed, enforcement discretion provides no au-
thority “to alter [legal] requirements and to establish with the force
of law that otherwise-prohibited conduct will not violate” a
statute.131 “An agency confronting resource constraints may change
its own conduct, but it cannot change the law.”132
The Constitution, indeed, directly expresses this limit by obli-
gating the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”133 Historically, English monarchs had claimed authority
not only to forbear enforcement of statutes in particular cases, but
also to wipe away those statutes’ legal effect, either generally in the
form of a suspension or more specifically in the form of a dispensa-
tion.134 Whatever else the President’s constitutional obligation of
faithful execution means (a point I have addressed at length else-
where135), it is widely understood to repudiate such prospective
cancellations of statutory law without affirmative authority from
Congress for doing so.136
131. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014).
132. Id. at 2446. For further elaboration of my views on enforcement discretion as an
executive authority, see Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 29, at 688.
133. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
134. See generally CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON & JANELLE RENFROW GREENBERG,
SUBJECTS AND SOVEREIGNS 24-29 (1981) (describing these powers and their recognized limits);
Reinstein, supra note 24, at 278-79 (“Two of the Crown’s asserted prerogatives had
empowered kings to suspend the operation of statutes and to grant individuals the
dispensation of not being bound by statutes.”).
135. Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 29, at 688-716.
136. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 59, at 142-43 (“[A]ll participants [in current debates]
agree that the President cannot decline to enforce altogether a law that is constitutional.”);
see also CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL” LAWS 16
(1998); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 86, at 803-04; Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional
Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1878 (2015) (“General agreement exists ... that the
[Take Care] Clause at least embodies the principle that the President must obey
constitutional laws and lacks a general prerogative or suspension power.”); Reinstein, supra
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In light of these principles, the default rule of due process must
be that official assurances do not in fact bar future enforcement—
even if regulated parties reasonably assumed that officials intended
to induce reliance on the assurance. Any contrary rule would oblit-
erate the basic anti-suspending limit on executive authority. A
binding nonenforcement promise, after all, is indistinguishable from
a change in law. If promised nonenforcement could carry binding
effect by virtue of individual reliance, then even ultra vires promises
of nonenforcement could become an effective dispensing power. As
a general matter, courts cannot protect regulated parties against
resulting confusion or unfairness because doing so would give
executive officials a power to change law that the Constitution itself
denies them.
This view appears consistent with the original constitutional
understanding of due process. At the least, in one important early
case, Supreme Court Justice William Paterson addressed claimed
reliance on presidential assurances in precisely these terms. In
United States v. Smith, the government prosecuted a would-be
military adventurer under a statute prohibiting preparations for
“any military expedition or enterprise” to be launched from the
United States “against the territory or dominions of any foreign
prince or state with whom the United States are at peace.”137 The
defendant offered evidence “that this military enterprise was begun,
prepared, and set on foot with the knowledge and approbation of the
executive department of our government,” but Justice Paterson,
presiding over the trial as Circuit Justice, deemed the proffered
evidence immaterial.138 The statute, Justice Paterson observed,
“imparts no dispensing power to the president. Does the constitu-
tion give it? Far from it, for it explicitly directs that he shall ‘take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”139 Executive officials thus
could not “authorize a person to do what the law forbids.”140 Any
contrary rule “would render the execution of the laws dependent on
[the President’s] will and pleasure,” though only the legislature
note 24, at 280.
137. 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1230.
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may properly change the law itself.141 As Justice Paterson acknowl-
edged, the executive branch could terminate the prosecution by
dismissing the charges, or the President could pardon the alleged
crime; but such measures, he wrote, “presume criminality, presume
guilt, presume amenability to judicial investigation and punish-
ment, which are very different from a power to dispense with the
law.”142 Thus, although the defendant in effect claimed reliance on
assurances from executive officials, Justice Paterson rejected any
reliance defense for fear of creating an executive authority to enable
conduct that the legislature sought to prohibit.143
Modern due process doctrine considers a broader range of factors.
Under the governing framework of Mathews v. Eldridge, procedural
due process analysis in general requires a relatively untethered
balancing of private and public interests affected by mandating a
particular procedure.144 But even if the modern approach in general
is more free form than Smith’s rigid formalism, structural consider-
ations have remained central to case law addressing problems of
reliance and retroactivity. In fact, the Supreme Court has character-
ized its retraoctivity analysis as seeking to ensure proper balance
between the “benefits of retroactivity” and “the potential for dis-
ruption or unfairness.”145
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id.; see also Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding that
executive “instructions cannot ... legalize an act which without those instructions would have
been a plain trespass”). For an argument that nineteenth-century due process doctrine
generally embodied principles we associate today with separation of powers, see Nathan S.
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE
L.J. 1672, 1677-79 (2012).
144. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that the constitutional sufficiency of government
procedures for deprivation of life, liberty, or property requires weighing (1) “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest”); see also Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (“The procedural protections required by the Due Process
Clause must be determined with reference to the rights and interests at stake in the
particular case.”).
145. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994) (justifying presumption against
retroactivity on the grounds that requiring “Congress [to] first make its intention clear helps
ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the
potential for disruption or unfairness”).
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Moreover, the Court has generally struck this due process balance
in a manner that gives only limited protection to reliance on law or
government policy remaining constant. With respect to criminal
laws, the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents retroactive imposition of
liability for completed conduct.146 In contrast, the Court understands
the Due Process Clause to establish only a presumption against
retroactivity, not a hard and fast rule; legislatures thus may pass
retroactive laws provided they do so clearly.147 In addition, due
process doctrine generally restricts only what some scholars have
called “strong” or “primary” retroactivity, meaning retroactive
change in the legal treatment of completed past transactions.148 The
doctrine does not prevent “weak” or “secondary” retroactivity, that
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2085 (2013) (“The
[Ex Post Facto] Clause ensures that individuals have fair warning of applicable laws and
guards against vindictive legislative action.”); Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2332
(2012) (“[T]he Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits applying a new Act’s higher
penalties to pre-Act conduct.” (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted)).
147. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266-68, 280.
148. See id. at 270, 280 (defining constitutionally suspect retroactivity in terms of whether
a law “would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed,” but also
emphasizing that the inquiry requires a functional assessment of “the nature and extent of
the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and
a relevant past event”); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (upholding
retroactive imposition of liability on past conduct because the particular law’s retroactivity
was “a rational measure to spread [associated] costs” of past activity). For general discussion
of the distinction between strongly and weakly retroactive laws, see, for example, Jill E. Fisch,
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1068-69
(1997); Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1222, 1263-64 (2009). For cases applying the distinction, see, for example, Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 220 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (applying distinction
in administrative context); Nat’l Petrochemical & Refiners Ass’n v. EPA, 630 F.3d 145, 159
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing “the distinction between a rule that imposes new sanctions on
past conduct, which is retroactive and invalid unless specifically authorized, and one that
merely ‘upsets expectations,’” and characterizing Landgraf as “mak[ing] a similar distinction
for statutes”); Swisher Int’l, Inc. v. Schafer, 550 F.3d 1046, 1058 (11th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
retroactivity challenge to assessment “based upon current participation in the market, such
that new entrants are assessed, as well as those who participated in the past,”
notwithstanding its impact on market participants’ expectations); Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v.
Sullivan, 957 F.2d 664, 671 (9th Cir. 1992) (characterizing regulation as “undeniably
affect[ing] the future legal consequences of past transactions,” but holding that “such
‘secondary retroactivity’ is an entirely lawful consequence of much agency rulemaking and
does not by itself render a rule invalid”).
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is, changes in law that disrupt expectations about what the law will
be in the future.149
As a practical matter, however, such expectations may be matters
of quite substantial reliance.150 Entrepreneurs start businesses in
reliance on the company’s product remaining legal; investors calcu-
late revenue streams based on settled expectations about tax rates
and deductions. Courts have denied constitutional protection to such
reliance interests not because they are unreasonable or insignifi-
cant, but rather because overriding structural considerations
support legislative authority to alter substantive laws.151 By the
same token, fairness considerations alone cannot form the core of
any defense of nonenforcement reliance. Instead, just as sovereign
legislative authority must often override reliance on seemingly
settled law, so too must legislative authority to establish sub-
stantive law often override reliance on official enforcement practice
with respect to that law.
To put the same point differently, the flip side of reliance is en-
trenchment—the limitation of future governments’ policy choices.152
As a practical matter, many legislative policies may be self-
entrenching: reliance on the policies, or even just psychological
attachment to them, may elevate the political stakes of any future
repeal effort.153 As a constitutional matter, however, the settled rule
149. See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1994) (“An entirely prospective
change in the law may disturb the relied-upon expectations of individuals, but such a change
would not be deemed therefore to be violative of due process.”).
150. A number of scholars have in fact criticized the distinction between primary and
secondary retroactivity as incoherent on this basis. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 148, at 1069.
Even if that is true, however, the broader point that any coherent antiretroactivity doctrine
must balance reliance interests against risks of legislative impairment remains valid. For one
proposal to reformulate certain land use doctrines along these lines, see Serkin, supra note
148, at 1288-90.
151. The Court, indeed, has allowed even primary retroactivity on the theory that
retroactive laws “often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, whether to respond to
emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention of a new statute in the interval
immediately preceding its passage, or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law
Congress considers salutary.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267-68; cf. United States v. Winstar
Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 881, 886-87 (1996) (plurality opinion) (holding that contract could bind
government to indemnify costs associated with regulatory change but stressing that “the
agreements do not purport to bind the Congress from enacting regulatory measures”).
152. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881 & n.4 (2011) (surveying literature and defining
entrenchment in these terms).
153. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125
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is that one legislature may not bind another; each successive
Congress must hold the same essential lawmaking power as its
predecessors.154 Executive enforcement policies, particularly such
overt and wide-ranging policies as the recent marijuana and
immigration initiatives, present a symmetric problem. As a practical
matter, enforcement choices, much like legislative policies, may
engender reliance or shift popular perceptions, erecting political
obstacles to any future shift in policy.155 But as a constitutional
matter, one executive cannot unilaterally forfeit another’s enforce-
ment authority any more than one Congress can forfeit another’s
legislative power.156 Accordingly, if a nonenforcement policy in
principle cannot be binding—if formally it assures only that for the
time being the government has better things to do—then due
process cannot prevent the government from shifting priorities in
the future and pursuing cases it led regulated parties to believe it
would ignore. Considerations of reliance and fair dealing must play
second fiddle to separation of powers.
2. Recognized Exceptions
As a general matter, then, constitutional fair notice principles
cannot protect reliance on nonenforcement. But if that is so, what
explains Raley, Cox, and PICCO? In these cases, as we have seen,
YALE L.J. 400, 402 (2015) (“[P]olitical actors intent on entrenching their preferred parties or
policies need not resort to manipulating the formal rules of the Constitution, elections, or
legislation.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Legislative Entrenchment: A
Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1666 (2002) (asserting equivalence between formal
entrenchment and “sunset clauses, conditional legislation and delegation, the creation,
modification, and abolition of administrative agencies, or any of the myriad of other policy
instruments that legislatures use to shape the legal and institutional environment of future
legislation”). For an empirical study suggesting that violations of unenforced laws carry
psychological costs for other individuals, see Ben Depoorter & Stephan Tontrup, The Costs of
Unenforced Laws: A Field Experiment 27-28 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 16-10, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2749166 [https://perma.cc/S9UJ-YNE5].
154. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 873 (“‘[A] general law ... may be repealed, amended or
disregarded by the legislature which enacted it,’ and ‘is not binding upon any subsequent
legislature.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 487 (1905))).
For a recent defense of the rule, see Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1852 (2012).
155. See Price, supra note 15, at 1147-48.
156. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 873 n.19.
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the Court held due process to bar prosecution when the government
invited reliance on specific assurances regarding planned conduct.157
The decisions themselves are remarkably undertheorized; they offer
little by way of rationale beyond inchoate outrage and vague
references to “traditional notions of fairness.”158 Properly under-
stood, however, the cases may be retheorized in terms of the
balancing framework characteristic of modern retroactivity
jurisprudence. From this perspective, the Raley-Cox-PICCO trilogy
establishes a narrow exception to the usual rule that ignorance of
the law is no excuse and “the interest of the citizenry as a whole in
obedience to the rule of law” must prevail over reliance on official
assurances.159 This exception is justified, moreover, because the
cases involved particular circumstances in which balancing fairness
and separation of powers favors protecting reliance.
a. Supreme Court Decisions
The key feature of Raley, Cox, and PICCO is that the government
officials involved did not merely promise forbearance from enforce-
ment, but instead exercised at least apparent authority to interpret
and expound governing law and, further, in fact issued guidance
that the defendants in question had no reason to doubt was correct.
In Raley, the Court emphasized that in the proceedings at issue “the
Chairman of the Commission, who clearly appeared to be the agent
of the State in a position to give such assurances, apprised three of
the [defendants] that the privilege [against self-incrimination] in
fact existed.”160 Moreover,
[o]ther members of the Commission and its counsel made
statements which were totally inconsistent with any belief in the
157. See supra Part I.A.
158. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO ), 411 U.S. 655, 674 (1973)
(“[T]here can be no doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of
criminal justice prevent the Government from proceeding with the prosecution.”); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965) (“[U]nder all the circumstances of this case, after the
public officials acted as they did, to sustain appellant’s later conviction for demonstrating
where they told him he could ‘would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the
State.’” (quoting Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959)).
159. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
160. Raley, 360 U.S. at 437.
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applicability of the immunity statute, and it is fair to character-
ize the whole conduct of the inquiry as to the four as identical
with what it would have been if [the state] had had no immunity
statute at all.161
These particular circumstances—involving “active misleading” as to
the law by officials with apparent authority to interpret and apply
governing statutes—appeared to underlie the Court’s judgment that
conviction for refusal to answer under these circumstances consti-
tuted “the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State—con-
victing a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly
had told him was available to him.”162
In Cox, similarly, executive officials advised the defendants not
only that they would not be arrested for protesting where they
planned, but that doing so would in fact be affirmatively lawful.163
Although the state statute in question prohibited protests “in or
near” a court building,164 senior police officials evidently granted the
protesters permission to demonstrate in the location they chose.165
Quoting Raley, the Court again found “an indefensible sort of
entrapment by the State” in punishing the protesters for conduct
that the state itself appeared to authorize.166 Yet the Court in Cox
emphasized that the statute implicitly conferred interpretive dis-
cretion on local police officials.167 The Court wrote:
[I]t is clear that the statute, with respect to the determination
of how near the courthouse a particular demonstration can be,
foresees a degree of on-the-spot administrative interpretation by
officials charged with responsibility for administering and
enforcing it. It is apparent that demonstrators, such as those
involved here, would justifiably tend to rely on this administra-
tive interpretation of how “near” the courthouse a particular
demonstration might take place.168
161. Id. at 437-38.
162. Id. at 438.
163. Cox, 379 U.S. at 571.
164. Id. at 560 (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401 (1962)).
165. Id. at 569.
166. Id. at 571.
167. Id. at 568-69.
168. Id.
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The Court, moreover, emphasized that the limited interpretive
discretion afforded by this statute did not “constitute a waiver of law
which is beyond the power of the police,” nor was it comparable to
“allowing one to commit, for example, murder, or robbery.”169
In PICCO, finally, the Court emphasized that the defendant had
relied on an administrative construction of applicable prohibitions
by the very agency charged with administering those prohibitions.170
According to the Court, it violated due process to deny these defen-
dants the opportunity to present evidence of reliance on the agency’s
“longstanding administrative construction” of the statute in
question.171 The defendant, the Court explained, “had a right to look
to the [agency’s] regulations for guidance”—after all, the regula-
tions’ “designed purpose was to guide persons as to the meaning and
requirements of the statute.”172 Accordingly, in the Court’s view, “to
the extent that the regulations deprived [the defendant] of fair
warning as to what conduct the Government intended to make
criminal, ... there can be no doubt that traditional notions of fairness
inherent in our system of criminal justice prevent[ed] the Govern-
ment from proceeding with the prosecution.”173
In Raley, Cox, and PICCO, the Court thus recognized that, in at
least some circumstances, a due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness might prevent executive officials from criminally prosecut-
ing private parties for conduct those officials had promised to allow.
As already noted, however, the Court’s opinions left important
ambiguities about the scope of this guarantee—about what sorts of
government promises could count as impermissible “entrapment,”
and about when private reliance on such promises could be reason-
able.174 Some observers at the time hoped for an expansive
doctrine.175 One commentator argued in 1969, based on Raley and
Cox, that “[w]henever the law goes largely unenforced against a
particular class of violations for reasons which suggest that officials
do not really want to sanction these violations, an estoppel defense
169. Id. at 569.
170. United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655, 673-74 (1973).
171. Id. at 657.
172. Id. at 674.
173. Id.
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See, e.g., Comment, Applying Estoppel Principles in Criminal Cases, 78 YALE L.J.
1046, 1062-63 (1969) (advocating broad estoppel defense based on Raley and Cox).
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should be available to the occasional transgressor who relies on the
enforcement policy and is prosecuted.”176
Yet the three cases also track a narrower line: that individuals
may rely on assurances of legality only if those assurances reason-
ably appear to reflect authoritative interpretation of governing law,
rather than a mere choice not to enforce that law under the circum-
stances. This understanding was implicit in Raley, in which the
witnesses had no reason to suspect the Commission’s assurances
were mistaken.177 It was explicit in both Cox and PICCO; in those
decisions, the Court emphasized that officials in question had not
claimed any improper “waiver” authority,178 but rather advanced an
apparent “administrative construction” of the governing substantive
law.179 Consistent with this interpretation, the Court’s more recent
estoppel cases have emphasized the loss to the “citizenry as a whole”
if government assurances bar future enforcement of otherwise-
applicable substantive law.180
So construed, the three decisions are justified because they
involve circumstances presenting quite different tradeoffs from
garden-variety nonenforcement. On the individual side of the
balance, fairness concerns are particularly acute in this circum-
stance. Even if ignorance of the law is normally no excuse, fair
notice concerns carry particular force when regulated parties, far
from lacking actual notice of the law, in fact receive affirmative
official assurances that the law allows their activity.181 At the same
time, separation of powers concerns may be somewhat attenuated,
because protecting reliance on assessments of this sort will normally
advance rather than undermine systemic interests in private ad-
herence to public law. Seeking guidance from enforcement officials
is normally a way in which regulated parties learn what they can-
not do.182 Denying reliance across the board on such guidance could
176. Id. at 1070-71; see also PICCO, 411 U.S. at 674 (favorably citing this Comment).
177. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 439-40 (1959).
178. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569 (1965).
179. PICCO, 411 U.S. at 657.
180. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984); see
also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 423 (1990) (noting the strength of the
government’s argument that recognizing estoppel based on executive misrepresentations
would “invade the legislative province reserved to Congress”).
181. See, e.g., Raley, 360 U.S. at 425-26.
182. See, e.g., Emily Cauble, Detrimental Reliance on IRS Guidance, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 421,
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thus have corrosive effects on citizens’ overall legal compliance and
respect for government.183
Furthermore, drawing the reliance boundary at this limit
intersects importantly with principles of reviewability. While the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) to exempt case-specific enforcement decisions from judicial
review,184 formal assurances of legality may be reviewable, at least
if they are sufficiently definitive to qualify as “final agency action”
and a challenger with standing brings suit.185 I have argued
elsewhere that general policies deeming statutorily proscribed
conduct affirmatively lawful should often be subject to review and
invalidation under the APA, even if the policy is framed in terms of
enforcement.186 To the extent that is true, reliance may be the flip
side of reviewability. When a policy is subject to legally protected
reliance, it may also be subject to pre-enforcement review, at least
if a party with sufficiently concrete adverse interests chooses to
challenge it.187 On the other hand, enforcement policies—even those
422-24 (discussing implications of taxpayer usage of formal and informal IRS guidance); Mark
Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX.
L. REV. 331, 340-44 (2011) (discussing benefits of guidance documents in general).
183. Richard Pierce argues in more starkly utilitarian terms that official guidance
functions as free but unreliable advice that regulated parties rationally employ when they do
not wish to pay for more reliable private counsel. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE 1102 (5th ed. 2010) (estimating the chance of erroneous Internal Revenue
Service advice at 15 percent and suggesting that “[a] prudent taxpayer relies exclusively on
the free advice available from IRS in the high proportion of cases in which the consequences
of relying on erroneous advice are too small to justify paying money to reduce the risk that
the advice is wrong”). While this account may accurately reflect the understanding of
sophisticated parties, it seems likely to underestimate the real reliance that ordinary citizens
place on advice received through channels such as Internal Revenue Service help lines. See
Cauble, supra note 182, at 463-65 (discussing the use of informal IRS services).
184. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
185. See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813-14 (2016)
(upholding reviewability of agency “jurisdictional determination” because the agency action
involved a relatively formal agency decision and entailed the grant or denial of an effective
five-year safe harbor from official sanction); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)
(establishing two-part test of finality in which agency action is reviewable if it “mark[s] the
‘consummation’ of the agency’s decisionmaking process,” so that it is not “of a merely tentative
or interlocutory nature,” and is also an action “by which ‘rights or obligations have been
determined,’ or from which ‘legal consequences will flow’” (quoting Port of Bos. Marine
Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71 (1970))).
186. See Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question, supra note 29, at 1622-24.
187. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (upholding preenforcement
review under ripeness doctrine).
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that defy proper notions of faithful execution—may often evade
judicial correction because of judicial manageability problems and
limits on APA reviewability.188 By the same token, however, such
policies are not subject to legally protected reliance. Hence, in many
cases, back-end legal risk substitutes for front-end judicial review
in confining executive freedom of action.
At any rate, limiting the reliance defense to cases involving
formal assurance of legality significantly limits its range of potential
application, thus cabining any capacity for executive officials to alter
substantive law through enforcement policy. By channeling the
reliance inquiry into consideration of whether officials provided
assurances of legality, the Raley-Cox-PICCO doctrine effectively
replaces one formal line with another, swapping the general rule
that reliance is unprotected for a narrower rule that reliance can be
protected only if executive officials provided assurances of legality
rather than mere promises of forbearance. While perhaps “highly
formalistic,”189 this line is at least readily administrable, and it
tracks the same basic boundary between legal interpretation and
enforcement discretion that necessarily underlies the doctrine as a
whole.
Even so, the due process analysis cannot turn entirely on the
character of the assurance executive officials provided. Raley, Cox,
and PICCO cannot mean that a reliance defense is always available
so long as enforcement officials provide assurance of legality rather
than mere promises of forbearance. If the cases stood for any such
bright-line rule, then the problem of ultra vires executive suspend-
ing power would simply recur in different guise: executive officials
could alter substantive laws simply by framing their assurances as
promises of legality, however implausible under the circumstances.
Instead, as lower courts have recognized, the due process reliance
defense must be cabined by some further assessment of reasonable-
ness—of whether, under the particular circumstances, the legal
guidance was facially plausible and a regulated party genuinely
interested in following the law would rely on it.190 While this
188. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831; see also Price, Law Enforcement as Political Question,
supra note 29, at 1599-1600 (discussing Heckler).
189. Mikos, supra note 118, at 643.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring such
a showing of reasonableness by criminal defendant).
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reasonableness inquiry risks collapsing into circularity—reliance is
reasonable if it is legally protected and legally protected if it is
reasonable—lower courts have sought to give it content through
case-specific elaboration.
b. Lower Court Elaboration
In the years since PICCO, lower federal courts have recognized
two related criminal defenses based on the Supreme Court’s
holdings. The first is confusingly named “entrapment by estoppel,”
by which courts seem to mean something more like “anti-entrap-
ment estoppel.” This doctrine prevents prosecution when, “because
of the statements of an official, the defendant believes that his
conduct constitutes no offense.”191 The second defense, called “public
authority,” may apply when, as in an undercover operation, “the
defendant engages in conduct at the request of a government official
that the defendant knows to be otherwise illegal.”192
Lower courts have appropriately limited both defenses to cut off
the broader potential implications of Raley, Cox, and PICCO and
restrict due process protection for reliance to contexts in which the
trade-offs between separation of powers and fairness are tolerable.
With respect to anti-entrapment estoppel, as already noted, courts
have imposed a reasonableness gloss on the Supreme Court’s
suggestion that official assurances of legality may legitimately
invite reliance. Federal courts thus generally require two key
elements for an entrapment by estoppel defense: “that the govern-
ment affirmatively told [the defendant] the proscribed conduct was
permissible, and that [the defendant] reasonably relied on the
government’s statement.”193 
191. United States v. Jumah, 493 F.3d 868, 874 n.4 (7th Cir. 2007).
192. Id.
193. United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 567 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States
v. Ramirez-Valencia, 202 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)). Courts have offered various
formulations of the defense’s requirements. See, e.g., United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858,
886 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that “a defendant must prove (1) that there was an ‘active
misleading by a government agent’; (2) that the defendant actually relied upon the agent’s
representation, which was ‘reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law
misrepresented, and the substance of the misrepresentation’; and (3) that the government
agent is ‘one who is responsible for interpreting, administering, or enforcing the law defining
the offense.’” (quoting United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2006)));
United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying a five-element test
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As the Tenth Circuit recently explained, “consistent enforcement
of the law requires a reasonableness limitation on the entrapment-
by-estoppel exception to the general rule” that a mistake of law is no
defense.194 Without such a limitation, “the more successfully a
defendant presented himself as ill-educated or naïve, the stronger
would be his argument.”195 Courts, accordingly, have demanded that
reliance be “reasonable—in the sense that a person sincerely desir-
ous of obeying the law would have accepted the information as true,
and would not have been put on notice to make further inquiries.”196
In other words, the reliance must be “reasonable in light of the
identity of the agent, the point of law misrepresented, and the sub-
stance of the misrepresentation.”197 By these measures, courts have
rejected reliance claims when the defendant provided false informa-
tion to authorities,198 when government officials sent “mixed
messages” about whether planned conduct was legal,199 when the
government provided the relied-upon assurances to third parties,200
when state rather than federal officials provided inaccurate
with similar components).
194. United States v. Rampton, 762 F.3d 1152, 1157 (10th Cir. 2014).
195. Id. (quoting United States v. Rector, 111 F.3d 503, 506 (7th Cir. 1997)).
196. United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Batterjee, 361
F.3d at 1216-17.
197. Bader, 678 F.3d at 886 (quoting Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1205).
198. See, e.g., Rampton, 762 F.3d at 1157-58 (collecting cases).
199. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 715 (1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting an
entrapment by estoppel defense for possession of firearms when a federal agent allegedly told
defendant “both that [he] could not legally possess the weapons and that he should keep them
to facilitate his information-gathering for the government”); see also United States v. Barber,
603 F. App’x 643, 644 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding a “vague statement” by official insufficient to
support an entrapment by estoppel defense).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Eaton, 179 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (re-
jecting, in a wildlife trafficking prosecution, “reliance on the perceived pattern of Government
agents allowing other missionaries to import snakes in their personal luggage”).
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guidance about federal prohibitions,201 and when the defendant
himself had a particular obligation to know the law.202
Courts have often tried to justify these exceptions in terms of
fairness, based on the rather circular logic that there is nothing
unfair about penalizing someone when a reasonable person would
not have relied.203 In fact, however, these limits may permit quite
significant unfairness. Is it really unreasonable for a nonlawyer
citizen to overestimate state officials’ authority to provide guidance
on federal law, or to misjudge the extent of a particular official’s
responsibility with respect to administering federal law? The bal-
ancing framework articulated above better explains the judicial
impulse underlying the reasonableness limitation. Through common
law elaboration of reasonableness standards, courts have protected
the separation of powers side of the ledger by limiting circumstances
in which protecting even quite reasonable reliance would result in
giving particular officials undelegated authority to alter the con-
tent of legal obligations.
The public authority defense is subject to still sharper limits.204
This defense recognizes that public officials and their agents
sometimes break the law to enforce the law.205 Stings, undercover
201. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 773 F.3d 25, 29-30 (4th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing
Raley and Cox and rejecting an entrapment by estoppel defense when the alleged mistaken
advice and the subsequent prosecution came from “two different sovereigns”); United States
v. Baker, 438 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[L]ocal law enforcement officials ... generally do
not have the authority to exempt individuals from violations of federal firearm laws.”); United
States v. Ormsby, 252 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 2001) (“When this defense is asserted with
respect to a federal offense, representations or assurances by state or local officials lack the
authority to bind the federal government to an erroneous interpretation of federal law.”). But
cf. United States v. Brady, 710 F. Supp. 290, 295-96 (D. Colo. 1989) (upholding an entrapment
by estoppel defense when defendant relied on erroneous advice from a state judge who was
“constitutionally obligated to apply federal law when he gave advice to the defendant”).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Rodman, 776 F.3d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting this
defense when defendant allegedly relied on guidance from federally licensed firearms dealer
but was himself a licensed dealer with a duty “to be familiar with the relevant law”). The
Ninth Circuit has held that erroneous guidance from federally licensed firearms dealers may
support a defense of entrapment by estoppel. See United States v. Tallmadge, 829 F.2d 767,
774 (9th Cir. 1987). Other circuits have rejected this view. See, e.g., United States v.
Hardridge, 379 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases), reh’g granted in part on
other grounds, 149 F. App’x 746 (10th Cir. 2005).
203. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
204. See generally United States v. Sariles, 645 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Fulcher, 250 F.3d 244, 254 (4th Cir. 2001).
205. See Fulcher, 250 F.3d at 253.
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operations, and other tactics essential to ferreting out crime and
advancing counter-intelligence objectives may sometimes involve
conduct that would violate criminal laws if undertaken by private
citizens on their own initiative. Accordingly, just as the defendants
in Raley, Cox, and PICCO mistakenly believed their conduct was
lawful because government agents told them so,206 defendants in
public authority cases claim to have believed their conduct was
lawful because law enforcement or intelligence officials authorized
it.207 Federal courts, however, have effectively collapsed this defense
into an inquiry about substantive legality.208 Apart from one early
opinion by a single circuit judge,209 courts have recognized the
defense only when public officials held actual, as opposed to merely
apparent, authority to approve the conduct in question.210 Thus, in
one typical example, the Third Circuit rejected the defense when a
confidential informant possessed a large quantity of cocaine in
alleged reliance on two officials’ permission, but unrebutted tes-
timony indicated the officials could have authorized the conduct
only with the permission of more senior officers.211
206. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO ), 411 U.S. 655, 673-74 (1973);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569, 570-72 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 431-32, 437
(1959).
207. See Fulcher, 250 F.3d at 253.
208. See id. at 254.
209. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Merhige, J.,
concurring).
210. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarado, 808 F.3d 474, 484 (11th Cir. 2015) (indicating that
the public authority defense requires that “the government official on whom the defendant
purportedly relied must have actually had the authority to permit a cooperating individual
to commit the criminal act in question”); United States v. Sariles, 645 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir.
2011) (as revised) (“[W]e hold that the public authority defense requires the defendant
reasonably to rely on the actual, not apparent, authority of the government official or law
enforcement officer to engage the defendant in covert activity.” (emphasis added)); Fulcher,
250 F.3d at 254 (collecting cases and “adopt[ing] the unanimous view of our sister circuits that
the defense of public authority requires reasonable reliance upon the actual authority of a
government official to engage him in a covert activity”). As with the entrapment by estoppel
defense, courts further hold that reliance must be “reasonable as well as sincere.” United
States v. Burrows, 36 F.3d 875, 882 (9th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Bulger, 928 F.
Supp. 2d 294, 303 (D. Mass. 2013) (“The proposition that a defendant may commit a criminal
act without prior notice to any Government official on the basis of a supposed carte blanche
authorization or a license to do everything but kill is without precedent and stretches any
concept of good faith reliance beyond recognition.” (quoting United States v. Berg, 643 F.
Supp. 1472, 1480 (E.D.N.Y. 1986))), aff’d, 816 F.3d 137 (1st Cir. 2016).
211. United States v. Pitt, 193 F.3d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1999); see also, e.g., United States v.
Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1235-36 (11th Cir.) (rejecting defense because under applicable
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No conceivable fairness rationale justifies this limitation on the
public authority defense. From the individual informant’s point of
view, government assurances are no less an “indefensible sort of
entrapment”212 because the official who offered them lacked genuine
authority to do so. Indeed, levels of official authority within the
agency will often be entirely opaque to those on the outside. The
limits courts have imposed on this defense instead, once again,
reflect structural concerns rooted in separation of powers. Like
Justice Paterson in Smith, courts have declined to give every law
enforcement official an effective dispensing power,213 and by
extension every defendant a “Nuremberg defense” of having been
following government orders.214 Instead, again just as the Court did
in Smith, courts have refracted their due process analysis through
separation of powers concerns about executive authority and the
rule of law.215 Doing so, however, effectively closes any gap between
reliance and authorization: informants may rely on government
authorization only when that authorization in fact provides lawful
authority for their conduct.216
In sum, the due process reliance defense recognized in Raley, Cox,
and PICCO, as further developed in lower federal courts, reflects an
implicit balancing of fairness considerations against separation of
executive orders intelligence agencies lacked authority to authorize violations of narcotics
laws), modified, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986).
212. Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 426 (1959).
213. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229-30 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
214. See, e.g., United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 878-79, 881 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam)
(rejecting proposed defense of good-faith reliance on superior’s apparent authority to permit
conduct because it would “go so far as to conjure the notion of a ‘Nuremberg’ defense, a notion
from which our criminal justice system, one based on individual accountability and
responsibility, has historically recoiled”), opinion partially withdrawn on other grounds, 920
F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
215. See Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1229-30.
216. Under a general canon of construction associated with Nardone v. United States,
statutory prohibitions do not necessarily apply to the government itself. See 302 U.S. 379, 383
(1937) (describing “[t]he canon that the general words of a statute do not include the
government or affect its rights unless the construction be clear and indisputable upon the text
of the act”); see also United States v. Anty, 203 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
general statutory bribery prohibition “does not prohibit the United States from acting in
accordance with long-standing practice and statutory authority to pay fees, expenses, and
rewards to informants”). For a wide-ranging critique of government officials’ disregard for
generally applicable laws in conducting undercover investigations, see generally Elizabeth E.
Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 155 (2009).
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powers costs, with the balance strongly tilted in favor of the latter.
Defendants may sometimes rely on government assurances of le-
gality if those assurances appear to reflect legitimate authority to
expound governing law. But these cases provide no defense if gov-
ernment officials only promised nonenforcement, or if reliance on
their assurances was “unreasonable,” or if officials authorized
lawbreaking but lacked actual authority to excuse the invited vio-
lations. Some decisions reaching such results acknowledge the
fundamental unfairness that may result when the government
invites conduct and then punishes the perpetrator for it. Yet the
lines courts have ultimately drawn better track separation of powers
anxieties about officials changing the law without proper authority.
Even quite egregious unfairness triggers no due process barrier to
prosecution when separation of powers concerns are acute.
3. Recent Administrative Decisions Explained
Framing reliance defenses in terms of a balance between fairness
and separation of powers also sheds important light on recent
administrative law decisions that have indirectly elaborated the
same due process reliance principles. In several Supreme Court
cases in recent years, regulated parties have cried foul over
apparent shifts in agency enforcement practice.217 In two such
decisions, moreover, the Court understood due process principles or
APA anti-arbitrariness standards to effectively protect reliance on
past nonenforcement.218 These cases provide further important
evidence that problems of nonenforcement reliance may arise across
a range of substantive domains—and indeed that recent trends
toward presidential administration and partisan polarization might
well generate recurrent problems of reliance as changes in adminis-
tration yield sharp periodic shifts in agency policy. But the decisions
should not be read too broadly. Far from suggesting any general
protection for reliance on nonenforcement, these decisions ef-
fectively track, and thus reinforce, the same distinction between
217. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2124-26 (2016); Fox II, 132
S. Ct. 2307, 2317-18 (2012); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2161,
2164-67 (2012).
218. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2317-18; Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168.
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interpretation and enforcement that underlies the Raley-Cox-PICCO
trilogy.219
First, in two successive decisions regarding the same litigation,
the Court addressed challenges to a shift in the Federal Communi-
cations Commission’s enforcement policy with respect to a statutory
prohibition on “obscene, indecent, or profane” broadcasts.220 In its
first decision, FCC v. Fox Televisions Stations (Fox I), the Court held
that although the agency may change enforcement policy, it must
provide a reasoned explanation for disrupting any “serious reliance
interests” engendered by the existing policy.221 In the second de-
cision in the same litigation (Fox II), the Court nonetheless held
that due process requirements of fair notice barred the agency from
sanctioning broadcasters for content they could not reasonably have
anticipated would be considered “indecent.”222 In both decisions, the
Court effectively protected regulated parties’ reliance on past agency
assurances about how governing statutory standards would be
enforced.223 Yet the enforcement policies in question were more than
just statements of agency priorities; they reflected the agency’s
evident interpretation of governing statutory standards that would
otherwise be quite indeterminate. Fox I and Fox II thus stand for
the proposition that when Congress gives agencies broad delegated
authority to give meaning to capacious statutory standards, due
process requires fair warning of significant shifts in agency inter-
pretation.224 The cases do not protect reliance on enforcement
policies in general.
Another decision from the same year as Fox II is similar. In
Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Court rejected the
Department of Labor’s view (asserted in litigation brought by
private plaintiffs) that applicable regulations defined certain phar-
maceutical sales representatives as employees subject to federal
wage and hour requirements rather than “outside salesm[e]n”
219. See Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2318 (acknowledging a defense due to a change in apparent
statutory interpretation after a period of actual nonenforcement rather than merely a promise
of nonenforcement); Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
220. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012).
221. Fox I, 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009).
222. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
223. See id.; Fox I, 556 U.S. at 515-16.
224. See Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2317; Fox I, 556 U.S. at 515-16.
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falling within a statutory exemption.225 Though acknowledging that
it would normally defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of
its own ambiguous regulations, the Court declined to apply such
deference in Christopher.226 Such deference was appropriate, the
Court reasoned, only when regulated parties had fair warning of the
agency’s interpretation.227 Yet in Christopher, according to the
Court, the agency had persistently failed to bring any enforcement
action or otherwise challenge “the industry’s decades-long practice”
with respect to the sales representatives.228
In effect, then, Christopher, like Fox I and Fox II, protected
regulated parties’ reliance on past agency enforcement practice,229
even though the past policies in question were not legislative rules
with the “force and effect of law” that formally bound the agency.230
Nevertheless, in Christopher, just as in Fox I and Fox II, it was
crucial to the Court’s analysis that the enforcement practice in
question reflected an apparent agency interpretation of governing
substantive law rather than mere prioritization of enforcement
efforts.231 Indeed, the Court “acknowledge[d] that an agency’s en-
forcement decisions are informed by a host of factors, some bearing
no relation to the agency’s views regarding whether a violation has
occurred.”232 The Court nonetheless protected regulated parties’
reliance only because the agency’s “very lengthy period of conspicu-
ous inaction” indicated under the circumstances that “the Depart-
ment did not think the industry’s practice was unlawful.”233 What is
more, although in Christopher the Court deemed the agency’s
interpretation “quite unpersuasive,”234 the Court’s deference holding
would readily have permitted liability if the industry’s practice
violated the best view of the applicable substantive law.235
225. 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2169 (2012).
226. Id. at 2166-68.
227. Id. at 2167.
228. Id. at 2168.
229. See id.
230. On the distinction between binding legislative rules and interpretive rules and policies
in general, see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015).
231. See Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
232. Id. at 2168 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)). 
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2169.
235. Much as courts defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of agency-administered
statutes under Chevron, they generally defer to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of
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In fact, under PICCO, due process may bar at least criminal
sanctions, if not also other penal remedies, even if the prior agency
view on which regulated parties relied at the time was not the best
interpretation of the statute or regulation.236 In PICCO, although
the Court ultimately remanded the case to determine whether the
defendant’s reliance was reasonable,237 the Court never suggested
that the inquiry turned on de novo interpretation of the statute; nor
did it suggest that the agency’s past view was legally binding. Quite
the opposite, the Court held open the possibility that good-faith
reliance afforded a defense despite suggesting that the agency’s past
construction of the statute was erroneous.238 Furthermore, in other
“fair notice” cases, the Court suggested that reliance on past agency
understandings may preclude retroactive sanctions, whatever the
merits of the agency’s past view.239
Just as with anti-entrapment estoppel, any inquiry into reason-
able reliance in this context must turn on whether, taking into
agency-administered regulations under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). See Christopher,
132 S. Ct. at 2166-67. The Court in Christopher denied such deference to the agency’s current
view because of the defendant’s reliance on the agency’s apparent contrary past view. Id. In
another recent decision, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, the Court similarly denied
Chevron defense to a legislative rule that disrupted regulated parties’ expectations. 136 S. Ct.
2117, 2127 (2016). Encino Motors, however, involved secondary rather than primary
retroactivity—the reliance in question involved prospective business operations developed in
reliance on the agency’s past views, rather than retroactive liability for completed
conduct—and the Court denied deference only because the agency inadequately addressed
reliance concerns in the rule’s preamble. Id. at 2126-27. For discussion of primary and
secondary retroactivity in the administrative context, see supra Part II.A.1.
236. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO ), 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 (1973).
237. Id. at 675.
238. See id. at 670-74; see also United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 752-53 (1979)
(characterizing Raley and Cox as indicating that “the Due Process Clause is implicated [when]
an individual has reasonably relied on agency regulations promulgated for his guidance or
benefit and has suffered substantially because of their violation by the agency”).
239. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (upholding agency authority
to announce new legal principles through adjudication rather than rulemaking but
emphasizing that “this is not a case in which some new liability is sought to be imposed on
individuals for past actions which were taken in good-faith reliance on Board pro-
nouncements[, n]or are fines or damages involved here”); United States v. AMC Entm’t, Inc.,
549 F.3d 760, 768 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[T]hose regulated by an administrative agency are entitled
to know the rules by which the game will be played.” (quoting Ala. Prof’l Hunters Ass’n v.
FAA, 177 F.3d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1999))); cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (indicating that whether the agency “has
consistently applied the interpretation embodied in the citation” is “a factor bearing on the
reasonableness of the [agency’s] position”).
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account the regulated party’s circumstances and legal sophistica-
tion, “a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law would have”
engaged in the conduct at issue.240 Here, too, in particular, sepa-
ration of powers considerations mandate some outer limit of
plausibility for reliance-inducing guidance that defies statutory
requirements; agencies cannot cancel statutes by promulgating
facially implausible interpretive rules. But whatever the precise
bounds of protected reliance on past interpretations in the adminis-
trative context, the key point here is that recent administrative
cases do not support any broader protection for nonenforcement
reliance than is supported by the anti-entrapment cases. Despite
references to agency “enforcement policy,”241 Fox II and Christopher
comport with the distinction between interpretation and enforce-
ment drawn in Raley, Cox, and PICCO.242 These decisions thus cast
no doubt on the settled view that agencies generally cannot
eliminate clear statutory obligations simply by failing to enforce
those obligations in some or all cases.243
240. See United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970). In fact, some lower
courts addressing claimed reliance on formally nonbinding agency guidance have engaged in
this type of inquiry. In the tax context, for example, although courts have generally held that
compliance with IRS publications cannot excuse statutory violations, see, e.g., Carpenter v.
United States, 495 F.2d 175, 184 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting claimed reliance on IRS publication
because “it is for the Congress and the courts and not the Treasury to declare the law
applicable to a given situation”), one court deemed it an abuse of discretion to impose a
regulatory interpretation retroactively with respect to a taxpayer who relied on an informal
manual promising that any future change would be prospective only, see Gehl Co. v. Comm’r,
795 F.2d 1324, 1333 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Miller v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 184, 195 (2000)
(“Administrative guidance contained in IRS publications is not binding on the Government,
nor can it change the plain meaning of tax statutes.”); cf. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68,
73 (1965) (rejecting claimed reliance on “prefatory statements” associated with internal
revenue bulletins because the statements were expressly “merely guidelines for Bureau
personnel”).
241. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 (2012); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136
S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (addressing “enforcement policy”); Christopher v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168 (2012) (discussing agency “enforcement decisions”).
242. See Fox II, 136 S. Ct. at 2318; Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2168.
243. As Mila Sohoni has suggested, these decisions might augur resurgence of a more
robust general standard of fair notice in the administrative context. Mila Sohoni, Notice and
the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1220-23 (2013). The decisions might imply, in other words,
that while Congress may delegate broad authorities to agencies, due process nonetheless
obligates agencies to provide advance warning regarding how they intend to interpret
capacious statutory standards. Id. To the extent that is true, cases involving reliance on past
agency views would simply constitute one application of a broader due process principle of fair
warning. See id. at 1223.
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B. Competing Proposals Rebutted
1. Current Doctrine’s Necessary Severity
Key decisions across both criminal and administrative contexts
thus have recognized that due process principles of fair notice may
sometimes prevent enforcement following assurances that planned
conduct will not incur sanctions. The Court’s key decisions, however,
limit this protection to contexts in which enforcement officials’ as-
surances reflect an apparent interpretation of governing law, as
opposed to a choice about where to focus enforcement efforts.244
Courts, moreover, have further limited due process protection for
reliance on such assurances to contexts in which that reliance is
reasonable in the specific sense that someone seeking to follow the
law might have relied as the defendant did.245 Far from tracking any
intuitive conception of fairness, these limits on due process protec-
tion instead reflect separation of powers constraints on executive
authority.246 Courts simply cannot protect regulated parties’ reliance
in all circumstances in which those parties feel entrapped—or even
in all circumstances in which any reasonable nonlawyer might feel
entrapped—because doing so would give executive officials a de
facto power to change substantive law that the Constitution denies
to them.
Once again, recent marijuana and immigration policies sharply
illuminate this gap between intuitive fairness and constitutional
due process. Those who have opened marijuana businesses, pur-
chased marijuana from such businesses, or even licensed, taxed, or
regulated such businesses clearly fall on the wrong side of the line
between legal assurance and enforcement discretion that courts
have thus far drawn.247 Possessing or distributing marijuana, or
conspiring to possess or distribute it, or even participating in an en-
terprise that does so—these activities all substantively, and unam-
biguously, violate federal criminal law.248 The federal government
244. See, e.g., Christopher, 132 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
245. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
246. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229-30 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,324).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083-84 (D. Mont.),
adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 4602838 (D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012).
248. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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at most issued a nonbinding promise not to enforce these laws in
certain circumstances; it did not purport to (and in any event could
not) alter the law itself.249
Much the same analysis applies to the Obama deferred action
programs, DACA and DAPA. Beneficiaries of these programs were
concededly removable under federal immigration statutes, even if
their removal would be a low priority for any sensible and humane
administration.250 Administrative cases such as Fox I, Fox II, and
Christopher thus offer no help. The substantive standards at issue
are not so capacious as to confer implicit interpretive authority; on
the contrary, the executive branch claimed authority only to defer
removal precisely because it could not reasonably interpret away
the substantive constraints on its authority to confer legal status.
Courts have in fact addressed these questions in several recent
marijuana-related cases and have repeatedly rejected reliance
defenses based solely on the Justice Department guidance.251 Yet
even if this result is doctrinally sound, on a real-world level it is
exceedingly harsh. As one judge observed in rejecting reliance
defenses in a marijuana prosecution, “when taken in the aggregate,
249. Given that private marijuana businesses and customers are violating federal law
rather than helping to enforce it, they also cannot qualify for any public authority defense. See
generally supra note 192 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 8, 72-78 and accompanying text.
251. See, e.g., Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 552 F. App’x 680, 683 (9th Cir.
2014) (rejecting an asserted estoppel defense because “at no point did the Government
promise not to enforce the [Controlled Substances Act]”); United States v. Canori, 737 F.3d
181, 184-85 (2d Cir. 2013) (“That the Department of Justice has chosen to prioritize certain
types of prosecutions unequivocally does not mean that some types of marijuana use are now
legal under the [Controlled Substances Act].”); United States v. Trujillo, No. CR-13-2109-FVS-
1, 2014 WL 3697796, at *2 (E.D. Wash. July 24, 2014) (rejecting an asserted defense based
on the Ogden and Cole memos because they do not “create enforceable rights”); Washington,
887 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-84 (rejecting reliance defense because “no federal official has ever
stated that the cultivation, sale, or use of medical marijuana is legal under federal law”);
Marin All. for Med. Marijuana v. Holder, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1155-56 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(rejecting an entrapment by estoppel theory because nothing in the DOJ’s marijuana guid-
ance “affirmatively informs medical marijuana growers and distributors that their conduct
is legal”); cf. United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1010 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (rejecting
an equal protection challenge to the Controlled Substance Act “[b]ecause the [Ogden] mem-
orandum does not treat individuals living in states where marijuana has been decriminalized
in whole or part differently from those who live in states where it has not”). In one such case,
the court did allow the defendants to present a reliance defense to the jury based on more
specific alleged statements by a particular government official. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d
at 1099.
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particularly through the filter of the news media, the words of fed-
eral officials,” though “nebulous, equivocal, and highly qualified,”
were nonetheless “enough to convince those who were considering
entry into the medical marijuana business that they could engage
in that enterprise without fear of federal criminal consequences.”252
Acknowledging the “strongly held belief among those in the medical
marijuana community that the federal government has not treated
them fairly,” the judge observed that providers’ choice to enter the
medical marijuana industry had proved “very costly”—they were
now “facing federal felony marijuana distribution charges,” some
with “mandatory minimum sentences of five years or more.”253
As this judge’s observations highlight, it is quite unlikely that
every ordinary marijuana seller or customer or, for that matter,
every undocumented immigrant who benefited from the Obama
Administration’s deferred action policies—individuals assured by
the President of the United States that they may “come out of the
shadows and get right with the law,”254 and that the President is
“not going to be using Justice Department resources to try to cir-
cumvent state laws on this issue”255—fully appreciated the legal
risks held open by disclaimers in the marijuana guidance and
deferred action policies. To the extent they read the disclaimers at
all (or were advised about them by their lawyers), such individuals
may well have perceived them to be lawyers’ technicalities, much
like arbitration clauses and other harsh terms in adhesionary con-
sumer contracts—technical rights, demanded by the lawyers, but
unlikely to govern actual social relations. Nor was that expectation
unreasonable: the government would normally keep such promises
(however nonbinding), just as it likely declines to prosecute many
informant cases in which public authority or entrapment by estoppel
defenses are technically inapplicable. Even holding open the
possibility of prosecution or removal in these cases is thus norma-
tively troubling, because nonenforcement seemed likely to generate
social realities in which individuals lost sight of the real legal risks
of their behavior.
252. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 1084.
253. Id.
254. Obama DAPA Speech, supra note 104.
255. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 (quoting a statement from Barack Obama’s
presidential campaign and collecting other similar statements).
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Nevertheless, here, as in other nonenforcement contexts, courts
cannot recognize an across-the-board reliance defense, because
doing so would effectively grant executive officials an unrestricted
suspending power—an authority to eliminate legal obligations by
inviting reliance on promised nonenforcement.256 For this reason,
one scholar’s recent attempt to justify a broader reliance defense
with respect to marijuana and immigration is unconvincing,257 and
two other possible approaches—preserving enforcement only pro-
spectively or weighing the normative importance of statutory
policies—also miss the mark.
2. Legalization Conflicts
Recoiling from the harshness of current doctrine as applied to
marijuana and immigration, Professor Mary Fan has proposed
recognizing a broader reliance defense whenever nonenforcement
results from what she calls a “legalization conflict.”258 On this view,
“when conduct is decriminalized or permitted by one authority while
remaining criminalized under another concurrent legal regime,”
reliance defenses should be available to the extent that “the entity
charged with enforcing the criminalization regime acquiesces in the
competing legalization regime.”259 Professor Fan thus argues that
future federal enforcement of federal marijuana laws against state-
licensed businesses should be barred because executive officials
“expressly acquiesced—and even facilitated—state legalization
efforts” by announcing federal nonenforcement policies despite
federal criminalization.260 Professor Fan contrasts the marijuana
example with federal officials’ express nonacquiescence in state laws
purporting to nullify federal firearms restrictions.261 In that context,
reliance would be unreasonable because federal officials gave
regulated parties no reason to believe they could rely on state
legalization of federally proscribed conduct.262 “States,” Professor
256. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229-30 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,324).
257. See Fan, supra note 11, at 912.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 910-12.
260. Id. at 948.
261. Id. at 949.
262. Id.
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Fan argues, “cannot by fiat render clear and controlling criminal-
ization unclear—but the conduct of agencies and officials charged
with administering the criminalization regime can change the
equities.”263
Though properly recognizing the sharp risk of confusion and
unfairness created by the Obama Administration’s marijuana policy,
Professor Fan’s analysis ultimately mistakes a separation of powers
problem for a federalism conflict. To begin with, as Professor Fan
acknowledges, the paradigm of “legalization conflict” fails to capture
the fairness problems resulting from deferred action, as immigra-
tion enforcement is exclusively federal.264 In that context, at least,
the problem was not conflicting federal and state law, but rather
conflicting executive and congressional policies.
Even in cases of federal-state conflict, however, legalization
conflicts present the question whether federal executive officials
hold authority to acquiesce in conflicting state law, and relatedly
whether reliance defenses should operate to cabin or enable such
executive action. To give the starkest example, Southern Jim Crow
regimes on some level involved a “legalization conflict”; at key
points, federal nonenforcement of civil rights protections may have
invited reliance by state officials on unconstitutional state laws and
practices that disenfranchised and discriminated against African
Americans.265 Yet federal executive officials held no authority to
263. Id.
264. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (deeming state immigration
enforcement measures preempted by federal law).
265. See generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF
RECONSTRUCTION 183 (2011) (describing “persistent though inadequate [federal] voting rights
enforcement” between 1876 and 1891 followed by “definitive political abandonment of blacks
in 1891”); Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT.
115, 131 (1994) (identifying “[a] major element” of white supremacist consolidation of power
in southern states after Reconstruction as “the continuation of fraud and political violence
against black voters—this time with no federal troops or threats of prosecutions under the Ku
Klux Klan Act to restrain them”); Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes,
74 YALE L.J. 1297, 1303–07 (1965) (discussing then-current federal policy with respect to
enforcement of Reconstruction-era criminal statutes and advocating mandatory duty of
prosecution). Admittedly, following Reconstruction’s collapse, the Supreme Court upheld some
Jim Crow practices, see, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding racial
segregation on railroad); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (rejecting suit alleging
discriminatory denial of voting rights), but the Supreme Court later repudiated this view in
decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racial
segregation in public schools).
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authorize what federal law prohibited, and by extension state
officials could place no justified reliance on federal nonenforcement.
Although forbearance from federal marijuana or immigration
enforcement obviously does not raise the same moral and policy
concerns as the shameful post-Reconstruction abandonment of civil
rights, the ultimate question these policies present is analogous: to
what degree may executive officials disable future federal enforce-
ment through present acquiescence in state-condoned violations of
federal law? The answer should be the same as well. However
compelling marijuana legalization or immigration relief may be as
a matter of policy, if federal enforcement officials lack authority to
legalize the conduct in question, reliance defenses should not
operate to grant them that authority across the board as a function
of due process.
3. Pure Prospectivity
Another alternative approach might protect reliance on an-
nounced nonenforcement policies retrospectively but not prospec-
tively. Under this approach, due process would bar enforcement
(either categorically or presumptively) with respect to conduct
undertaken while an overt nonenforcement policy was in effect, but
not conduct undertaken after its repeal. This approach may carry
intuitive appeal, particularly with respect to marijuana policy; one
would hope that no President would resume enforcement without
warning state-authorized businesses ahead of time to cease and
desist.266 Nevertheless, this option is not viable as a legal doctrine.
It would collapse the distinction between substantive law and its
enforcement, giving Presidents the very power to suspend laws that
enforcement discretion alone cannot provide.
For those sympathetic (as I am) to the Obama Administration’s
marijuana and immigration policies, it is important to remember
that the principle restricting suspension power must constrain other
266. Applying the proposal to immigration would be less straightforward, as unlawful
presence is arguably always an ongoing rather than completed violation. See Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (characterizing unlawful presence
as “an ongoing violation of United States law” (emphasis omitted)). For a contrary view that
removal is only a retrospective sanction for unlawful entry or a visa overstay, see Cox &
Rodríguez, supra note 59, at 200 (characterizing removal as a remedy for unlawful entry).
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Presidents too. As noted earlier, Trump or some other Republican
successor might well use aggressive nonenforcement policies to
curtail federal firearms restrictions, environmental protections, tax
requirements, or any number of other disfavored laws, even as he
goes about enforcing other laws with draconian regularity.
To be sure, at present, Trump’s co-partisans control both Houses
of Congress. He may thus obtain outright repeal of many laws he
disfavors. But Congress is unlikely to give him everything he wants,
and in any event nonenforcement is always easier than the hard
work of legislating; if nothing else, it may spare members of
Congress the need to take hard votes. Those who value federal
firearms restrictions, environmental protections, and other laws
threatened by Republican administrations should be able to count
on threats of future enforcement in a different administration to
keep some lid on statutorily proscribed behavior. As a general rule,
given constitutional limits on executive authority to change law
unilaterally, those who jump at the chance to violate valid federal
statutes should do so at their peril.
4. Normative Balancing
Some state court estoppel cases suggest a third possible frame-
work for broadening federal reliance defenses. Under this approach,
courts balance public and private interests affected by estopping the
government, but filter their assessments through a normative
judgment about the importance of the public policies at issue.267
Though state estoppel case law in general may provide a useful
model for federal courts (a point addressed further below268), the
normative dimension of some state courts’ estoppel inquiry fails to
provide a sound model for federal due process doctrine.269
While federal courts have resisted applying estoppel to the federal
government,270 some state courts have upheld equitable estoppel
267. See, e.g., City of Goleta v. Superior Court, 147 P.3d 1037, 1042 (Cal. 2006) (noting that
an estoppel defense generally cannot defeat a strong public policy interest).
268. See infra Part III.A.
269. I am grateful to Michael Asimow for calling my attention to this state case law.
Because a full fifty-state survey would go well beyond the scope of my analysis of federal law,
I focus on California cases as an example of an alternate approach.
270. See, e.g., Bartlett v. USDA, 716 F.3d 464, 477 (8th Cir. 2013); Kowalczyk v. INS, 245
F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that estoppel against the government does not lie in
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claims against state and local authorities.271 At the same time, these
state courts, like their federal counterparts, have recognized that
estopping official enforcement of public laws raises concerns absent
in the private law context.272 Indeed, in rough parallel to the frame-
work I have advocated here, some courts have recognized that
adjudicating equitable estoppel claims against the government
ultimately requires balancing essentially incommensurate private
and public interests.273 Even when the usual elements of equitable
estoppel are satisfied, for example, the California Supreme Court
permits estoppel against the government only if, “in the considered
view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result from a
failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any
effect upon public interest or policy which would result from the
raising of an estoppel.”274
the way it does against private litigants).
271. See, e.g., Prop. Owners Ass’n of the Highlands Subdivision A Portion of USMS 769 v.
City of Ketchikan, 781 P.2d 567, 573 (Alaska 1989) (“Estoppel may be asserted against a
public agency.”); City of Goleta, 147 P.3d at 1042 (noting that equitable estoppel might apply
against the government in certain circumstances); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d
423, 445 (Cal. 1970) (“It is settled that ‘[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied
against the government where justice and right require it.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 431 P.2d 245, 250 (1967))); Mesaba Aviation Div. of Halvorson
of Duluth, Inc. v. County of Itasca, 258 N.W.2d 877, 880 (Minn. 1977) (“[I]f justice demands,
estoppel can be applied against the government even when it acted in a sovereign capacity if
the equities advanced by the individual are sufficiently great.”); Blume Constr., Inc. v. State,
872 N.W.2d 312, 321 (N.D. 2015) (identifying elements of estoppel claim against state
government). But see, e.g., ABC Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 681 N.W.2d 596, 607
(Iowa 2004) (“We have consistently held equitable estoppel will not lie against a government
agency except in exceptional circumstances.”); Del Gallo v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 816
N.E.2d 108, 111 (Mass. 2004) (“Generally, the doctrine of estoppel is not applied against the
government in the exercise of its public duties, or against the enforcement of a statute.”
(quoting LaBarge v. Chief Admin. Justice of the Trial Court, 524 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Mass. 1988)));
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons, 299 P.3d 844, 854 (N.M. 2012) (“Generally equitable estoppel will
only be an effective defense against the State when there is a ‘shocking degree of aggravated
or overreaching conduct or where right and justice demand it.’” (quoting Waters-Haskins v.
N.M. Human Servs. Dep’t, 210 P.3d 817, 823 (N.M. 2009))).
272. See, e.g., City of Goleta, 147 P.3d at 1042.
273. See City of Long Beach, 476 P.2d at 448 (noting competing individual and public
interests).
274. Id.; see also, e.g., HPT IHG-2 Props. Tr. v. City of Anaheim, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 326, 337
(Ct. App. 2015); Schafer v. City of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 655, 666 (Ct. App. 2015)
(characterizing inquiry as requiring “weighing policy concerns to determine whether the
avoidance of injustice in the particular case justifies any adverse impact on public policy or
the public interest”). For similar recognition of the need for balancing in other state courts,
see, for example, Blume Constr., 872 N.W.2d at 321 (“Estoppel against the government is
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Given that federal courts have never been so frank about the
interplay of interests at stake in barring official enforcement of
public law, this state level case law offers important indirect
support for this Article’s central assertion that an analogous form
of balancing implicitly informs the relevant federal case law. As
discussed further below, it also suggests that some narrow federal
estoppel defense might workably be extended beyond criminal law
to civil and administrative enforcement of punitive sanctions.275
Nevertheless, in crafting this doctrine, some courts have engaged in
a frankly normative assessment of statutory policies that federal
courts have rightly resisted. As California courts, at least, have
framed the inquiry, the balance requires asking whether estoppel
would “defeat a strong public policy.”276 Courts have thus rejected
estoppel claims that would defeat putatively “strong” policies such
as land use restrictions,277 tax laws,278 and environmental stat-
utes,279 while giving greater scope to estoppel claims with respect to
available in limited circumstances and should be applied on a case-by-case basis with a
careful weighing of the inequities that would result if the doctrine is not applied versus the
public interest at stake and the resulting harm to that interest if the doctrine is applied.”
(quoting Miller v. Walsh Cty. Water Res. Dist., 819 N.W.2d 526, 534 (N.D. 2012))); In re
Spencer, 566 A.2d 959, 965-66 (Vt. 1989) (employing a balancing test drawn from City of Long
Beach, 476 P.2d 423).
275. See infra Part III.A.
276. City of Goleta, 147 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural Exam’rs, 952
P.2d 641, 661 (Cal. 1998)); see also, e.g., HPT IHG-2 Props. Tr., 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 337. For
analogous reasoning from other state courts, see, for example, Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 729 (Utah 1990) (rejecting an estoppel claim
when estoppel would “contravene the important public policy that the State should recover
full value from the lease of school trust land”).
277. See, e.g., Schafer, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 666 (emphasizing the “strong public policy in
favor of enforcing the substantive and procedural requirements for land use approvals”);
Pettitt v. City of Fresno, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Ct. App. 1973) (“In the field of zoning laws,
we are dealing with a vital public interest—not one that is strictly between the municipality
and the individual litigant.” (footnote omitted)).
278. See, e.g., Parmar v. Bd. of Equalization, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 405, 415 (Ct. App. 2011)
(“[I]t is the unusual case in which estoppel will be applied in tax cases.” (quoting U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 303 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Cal. 1956))); Transamerica
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 284 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13 (Ct. App. 1991)
(emphasizing the strength of public policies supporting collection of tax revenues despite
erroneous guidance from tax officials).
279. See, e.g., W. Wash. Props., LLC v. Dep’t of Transp., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 39, 49-50 (Ct.
App. 2012) (holding state agency was not estopped from requiring removal of an illegal
billboard left in place for twenty-two years).
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procedural preconditions for recovery280 or prevailing wage require-
ments for public contracts.281
For those with little love for harsh federal narcotics and immigra-
tion laws, this approach may well hold certain attractions: perhaps
federal enforcement in these areas should be estopped because the
laws themselves generally do little public good, while the injustice
of enforcement in individual cases may be manifest. But while such
normative assessments may be more comfortable for state courts
that hold common lawmaking powers and confront a diverse array
of state and municipal enforcement authorities,282 for federal courts
to interpret the Due Process Clause to embody such normative
judgments would itself raise separation of powers concerns. Indeed,
even apart from the pertinent constitutional considerations, the
very intensity of political disagreements surrounding federal laws
such as immigration and narcotics restrictions—as well as federal
firearms laws and any number of other prohibitions—suggests the
wisdom of seeking more neutral judicial standards for legally
protected reliance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has been correct
to emphasize the citizenry’s interest in “obedience to the rule of law”
when rejecting estoppel claims,283 and federal courts elaborating
anti-entrapment due process standards have likewise been correct
to emphasize the objective character of the assurances provided,
rather than the strength or wisdom of the underlying statutory
prohibitions at issue.284
In fairness, state courts, too, appear to have conducted this
normative inquiry with a heavy presumption in favor of preserving
statutory policies. Successful estoppel claims in California, at least,
appear to have been limited to specific cases rather than applied to
280. See, e.g., J.H. McKnight Ranch, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339, 350-51
(Ct. App. 2003).
281. Lusardi Constr. Co. v. Aubry, 824 P.2d 643, 655 (Cal. 1992) (applying equitable
estoppel to bar the imposition of penalties on a contractor who attempted in good-faith to
comply). For another example of estoppel defeating a substantive policy, see City of Long
Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 450-51 (Cal. 1970) (holding that allowing unlawful devel-
opment on public lands would not undermine any strong public policy in the unique
circumstances of the particular case).
282. For discussion of how state courts’ common law powers affect statutory interpretation,
see generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479
(2013).
283. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
284. See supra Part II.A.2.b. 
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generalized policies like recent federal marijuana and immigration
guidance.285 More to the point here, to say that due process analysis
must take the wisdom of statutory policies as a given is not to say
that courts cannot identify additional situations in which reliance
interests may properly receive due process protection. In fact,
elaborating the same framework that implicitly underlies existing
case law may permit identification of additional contexts in which
particularly acute fairness concerns, or particularly attenuated
separation of powers costs, may justify recognizing a due process
reliance defense.
III. CLARIFICATIONS AND QUALIFICATIONS
Due process principles, I have argued, cannot support a broad
doctrine of nonenforcement reliance. But if separation of powers
anxieties should override individual reliance interests as a general
matter, then framing the question as I have proposed—in terms of
an implicit separation of powers balance—also permits identifica-
tion of additional contexts, beyond those already recognized in the
criminal anti-entrapment cases, in which the balance should tip the
other way. Here, I briefly address four such examples: (1) case-
specific civil and administrative guidance that invites significant,
reasonable reliance; (2) indirect forms of reliance on nonenforcement
policies, such as through providing information to authorities or
aiding or facilitating primary violations; (3) congressionally man-
dated nonenforcement; and (4) longstanding overt nonenforcement
policies.
The inquiry this framework requires is often quite context-
dependent. As with any balance between incommensurate princi-
ples, the tradeoffs are messy and contestable; they involve a degree
of “judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock
is heavy.”286 To the extent categorical judgments are impossible,
285. For an overview of pertinent California case law, see MICHAEL ASIMOW ET AL.,
CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 10:145 to :149 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2016)
(citing cases that detail limitations on estoppel against the government).
286. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (criticizing a balancing test as applied to the dormant Commerce
Clause). I am grateful to Rob Mikos for emphasizing this point and calling my attention to
Justice Scalia’s apt metaphor.
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however, a degree of fact-specific unpredictability may often be as
much virtue as vice. Protecting reliance in any given case means
departing from the usual rule that statutory policy should prevail
over executive assurances. In the estoppel context, courts have
emphasized that because the doctrine aims “to avoid injustice in
particular cases,” its “hallmark ... is its flexible application.”287 The
same should often be true of the related due process standards
addressed here.
A. Case-Specific Estoppel as to Civil and Administrative Penalties
A first, fairly limited reform is that federal courts should recon-
sider their extreme hostility to case-specific estoppel claims outside
the criminal context. Lower courts appear to have applied the Raley-
Cox-PICCO doctrine exclusively to criminal prosecutions.288 More
generally, despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to close the door
completely on civil and administrative estoppel, federal courts
almost never accept such claims.289 As already noted, however,
recent “fair notice” cases in the administrative context have drawn
lines similar to those suggested by anti-entrapment case law,290 and
in any event the same due process principles of fair warning should
logically extend beyond criminal law to other penal sanctions.291 An
analogous defense thus should apply in appropriate civil and
administrative penalty cases—albeit with the same limits and
qualifications as in the criminal context.
Although many presume a sharp line between criminal and civil
enforcement, the Constitution fails to support any rigid distinction
on the questions most pertinent here. To be sure, the Ex Post Facto
Clause prohibits retroactive criminal (but not civil) legislation,292
287. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59.
288. See supra Part II.A.2.
289. See supra Part II.A.1.
290. See supra Part II.A.3.
291. Estoppel claims arise across a range of other contexts, too, such as benefits over-
payments and other administrative mistakes. I do not address here such other contexts, which
may well involve a different balance of factors.
292. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 370-71 (1997); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386,
399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.). For a critique of this view, see Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex
Post Facto Clause, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 727, 732 (claiming that the Ex Post Facto Clause
encompasses civil and criminal laws).
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and Presidents hold authority to grant clemency with respect to
criminal (but not civil) offenses.293 Furthermore, as discussed ear-
lier, administrative agencies often hold delegated lawmaking and
interpretive authority that criminal prosecutors lack.294 Yet the
same basic executive obligation of faithful execution applies in both
contexts, as does the same Due Process Clause. What is more,
although the stakes for the individual defendant may be higher in
criminal cases, and reliance concerns thus more acute, by the same
token the public policies at stake are (one hopes) more important in
the civil context. And while criminal violations typically carry mens
rea requirements that might in principle make good-faith compli-
ance efforts exculpating, courts have generally rejected wide-
ranging mistake-of-law defenses even in the criminal context.295 At
any rate, the Supreme Court itself has implied that analogous
reliance principles apply across criminal, civil, and administrative
contexts involving penal enforcement.296
Just as in the criminal context, then, a due process reliance
defense should sometimes bar civil or administrative penalties when
regulated parties placed significant reliance on specific assurances
that planned conduct was lawful. Accordingly, to be concrete, even
formally nonbinding no-action letters and advisory opinions from
enforcement agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission
might sometimes support an anti-entrapment estoppel defense, and
by the same token, so too should assurances provided through IRS
help lines and other official sources accessible to everyday citizens
seeking to comply with the law as best they can.
293. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (authorizing presidential clemency with respect to
“Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment”); Ex parte Grossman,
267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925) (“Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or
evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law.”); see also infra Part
IV.A.
294. See supra Part II.A.1.
295. See People v. Snyder, 652 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1982) (holding that mistake of law was not
a defense when defendant did not know she was a convicted felon); State v. Howard, 339 P.3d
809, 819 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting defendant’s mistake-of-law argument). But see
Jenkins v. State, 468 S.W.3d 656, 682 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that a trial court’s refusal
to instruct the jury on defendant’s mistake-of-law claim was not harmless error).
296. See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12 (1984)
(associating both PICCO and administrative fair notice cases with the “premise that when the
Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm a
private party as a result of governmental deception”).
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Much like the assurances protected by anti-entrapment estoppel
in the criminal context, such case-specific guidance regarding
planned conduct is likely, as a practical matter, to invite significant
detrimental reliance, thus raising particularly acute fairness con-
cerns. At the same time, protecting reliance may help promote
systemic interest in compliance without unduly eroding the bound-
ary between the law and its enforcement. Furthermore, if the
assurance in question relates only to one particular party or
transaction (and third parties cannot rely on it without seeking
guidance of their own), then barring enforcement may carry only
limited risks to overall statutory objectives. It is true that protecting
reliance may elevate the stakes for the agency, thus perhaps
making it less likely that agencies will adopt such programs in the
first place. But by the same token, even if anti-entrapment estoppel
bars retrospective enforcement in some cases, the agency will
presumably still gain at least as much as it loses in terms of
accomplishing its mission, particularly if it remains free to enforce
the best view of the law in other cases in which it issued no specific
guidance.297 At any rate, as we have seen, the intuition that a
narrow estoppel defense poses little threat to the rule of law appears
to underlie many state cases recognizing estoppel defenses, and the
sky has not fallen in California or elsewhere where courts are more
solicitous of compelling case-specific claims of reliance on mistaken
legal assurances.298
That said, protection for reliance must remain the exception
rather than the rule, and standards of reasonableness should turn
as much or more on structural considerations as on intuitive notions
of fair dealing. Reliance should again be protected based only on a
context-specific assessment that takes into account “the identity of
the agent, the point of law misrepresented, and the substance of the
misrepresentation,”299 as well as the circumstances and sophistica-
tion of the party seeking guidance.300 It must remain the case that
297. Cf. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1816 (2016) (rejecting
a similar “count your blessings” argument against the reviewability of certain agency
jurisdictional determinations in the Clean Water Act context).
298. See supra Part II.B.4.
299. United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 886 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006)).
300. United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970).
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estoppel is possible only if “a person sincerely desirous of obeying
the law would have accepted the information as true, and would not
have been put on notice to make further inquiries.”301
Courts accordingly should be far more solicitous of claims by
everyday citizens than those of sophisticated business entities.
Relatedly, well-lawyered parties with the sophistication to seek no-
action letters and the like should never be able to claim reliance on
legal interpretations that exceed the bounds of reasonable agency
interpretive discretion under applicable standards of deference. Due
process principles of fair warning might properly mean that an
agency is stuck in one particular case with a considered, reasonable
past interpretation that invited significant reliance. But due process
principles should not disable the public from vindicating statutory
requirements (or binding regulations implementing those statutes)
that a diligent regulated party of comparable sophistication could
have understood its conduct violated.
B. Indirect Reliance
A due process reliance defense should also protect some indirect
forms of reliance on nonenforcement policies. In particular, the
defense should often protect reliance in providing information to
authorities or engaging in crimes that facilitated or enabled primary
violations that the government disclaimed intent to pursue.
1. Provision of Information
One way in which parties may rely indirectly on nonenforcement
assurances is by providing authorities with information about their
own legal violations. As Robert Mikos has observed, information
gathering is a central aspect of law enforcement; it constitutes “the
bulk of what law enforcement agents actually do—gather and report
information about regulated activity.”302 Yet when the government
obtains information by assuring nonenforcement, due process prin-
ciples of fair notice should limit the government’s use of that
301. Id.
302. Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 103, 107 (2012).
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information in future enforcement efforts. That is so because, in this
context, fairness concerns are particularly acute, while the cost to
separation of powers is limited so long as the government may still
pursue the substantive violations in question by other means.
The Obama Administration’s immigration programs raise this
problem in stark form. As noted, to apply for deferred action under
DACA and DAPA, individual immigrants were required to provide
identifying information, such as their names and addresses, and
document that they met specified eligibility criteria.303 Were the
government to change course and resume enforcement, then these
applications could amount to “neatly packaging [the immigrants’]
information on a platter for law enforcement officials.”304 To
mitigate this risk, a DHS “frequently asked questions” webpage
advised: “Information provided in this request is protected from
disclosure to [enforcement agencies] for the purpose of immigration
enforcement proceedings unless the requestor meets [specified]
criteria” for issuing a notice to appear.305 Nevertheless, the website
also pointedly asserted that this “information sharing policy” was
subject to change “at any time without notice” and created no “right
or benefit.”306 The Fifth Circuit dissent’s defense of DAPA—that
collecting such information was “good policing” precisely because it
could facilitate future enforcement—implied that DAPA applicants’
reliance in providing information was legally unprotected.307 But
that view is mistaken.
If reliance defenses require balancing separation of powers costs
against risks of individual unfairness, in the immigration context
the balance should tip strongly in individual defendants’ favor. On
the one hand, separation of powers concerns are greatly reduced
insofar as the question relates only to use of information, rather
than actual enforcement of the law. Even if DACA and DAPA were
substantively unlawful, the revocability of deferred action itself
(along with ancillary legal benefits such as work authorization)
suffices to preserve the primacy of underlying substantive statutes
303. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
304. Fan, supra note 11, at 940.
305. DACA FAQs, supra note 98.
306. Id.
307. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 191 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting),
aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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over executive enforcement policy. Allowing a new administration
bent on enforcement to come out ahead, in terms of ease of enforce-
ment, because a prior administration pursued a more lenient policy
would overcorrect the problem: instead of simply restoring enforce-
ment and the associated deterrent effect of underlying immigration
restrictions, it would make the government’s enforcement job far
easier than it would have been without immigrants’ unsuspecting
cooperation.
On the other hand, the unfairness to individual applicants in
using their application information against them would be unusu-
ally sharp. A programmatic request for information based on a
promised form of amnesty invites reliance in a far more specific way
than does promised nonenforcement by itself. While the latter may
encourage changes in individual behavior, the former encourages
specific assistance to the government itself. It is bad enough to
apply a sporadically enforced law to a particular defendant in a
particular case. It is quite another thing to select individuals for en-
forcement precisely because the government earlier assured them
that they could avoid enforcement by providing specified informa-
tion.
Existing case law supports this result. To begin with, on a gut
level, the raw outrage underlying Raley, Cox, and PICCO justifies
recognizing a due process defense in this context. Whatever else
warrants the term, it is difficult to imagine a more outrageous “form
of entrapment” than establishing a program to enable legally unso-
phisticated young immigrants to “get right with the law”308 and then
converting the program into a massive dragnet. The government
simply should not treat otherwise law-abiding people this way. Even
apart from the immorality of doing so, the long-run costs to law
enforcement—in terms of alienating immigrant communities and
eroding trust in government assurances—would likely far outweigh
any short-run benefits to legal compliance. Furthermore, although
deportation is formally a civil rather than criminal remedy,309 the
Supreme Court has recognized that deportation carries conse-
quences for the individual every bit as severe—indeed, often more
308. See Obama DAPA Speech, supra note 104.
309. See, e.g., R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Unlawful
presence in the United States does not itself constitute a federal crime, although it can trigger
the civil remedy of removal.”).
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so—than criminal sanctions.310 The analogy to criminal reliance
cases is thus particularly apt.
On a doctrinal level, it is true that Raley, Cox, and PICCO
involved specific assurances that conduct was lawful, rather than a
mere promise of nonenforcement.311 Yet here, too, if we limit the
conduct under consideration to the provision of information as
opposed to the underlying substantive immigration violations, the
government’s assurances more closely resemble the type of assur-
ance that justified private parties’ reliance in those cases. Despite
insisting that granting deferred action does not preclude later
immigration enforcement, the government has effectively deemed
it “lawful,” in the sense of incurring no direct legal sanction, to
provide information in the context of a deferred action application.
In that sense, completing a DACA application, or for that matter
providing tax records and other information to the government
pursuant to the resulting work authorization, closely resembles
answering the legislative committee’s questions in Raley or protest-
ing at the police-recommended spot in Cox—it is conduct that the
government specifically invited with assurances of legality.312
Inviting such applications amounts to “active misleading” regarding
legal consequences, rather than mere passive acquiescence in
unlawful conduct.313 Due process should equally bar the government
from relying on information it obtained by such means.
Case law regarding immunity agreements offers further support
by analogy. When the government provides specific assurances to
suspects in exchange for specific forms of assistance, such as a plea
agreement or testimony in a criminal trial against another defen-
dant, courts have held that due process obligates the government to
310. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 368 (2010) (“Preserving the client’s right
to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail
sentence” (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001))); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135,
154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great
hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land
of freedom. That deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted.”);
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (observing that deportation “may result also
in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living”).
311. See United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. Corp. (PICCO), 411 U.S. 655, 675 (1973); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959).
312. See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text.
313. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438 (using the phrase “active misleading”).
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honor its contractual promises.314 The reliance here is effectively an
estoppel analogue to such contractual reliance. Although the
government has not received any specific benefit from the regulated
party’s reliance, it has invited detrimental reliance in exchange for
expected benefits to a degree that may properly limit the govern-
ment’s authority to renege. To be sure, some might assert that the
opportunity for future enforcement was precisely the advantage the
government obtained by offering deferred action. By that measure,
however, the deal the government offered was entirely one-sided
and egregiously deceptive: immigrants placed themselves at grave
risk while the government bound itself to nothing in return.
Nor does deferred action involve circumstances in which protect-
ing government trickery advances law enforcement interests. The
trickery here has a fundamentally different character from deceit
aimed at ferreting out violations, as in police interrogations;315 it
involves assuring the legality of conduct and then exploiting
individuals’ reliance to their detriment. In that sense, again, the
correct doctrinal reference point is not criminal procedure case law,
but rather the defense of entrapment by estoppel and the Raley-Cox-
PICCO line of cases that underlie it. Law enforcement officials may
often properly use deception to uncover otherwise undetectable
crimes, but unsuspecting individuals should not fall prey to future
enforcement following a change in policy because they participated
in a program that officials at the time pitched to them as advancing
their own interests.
Some critics of DACA and DAPA might argue, finally, that en-
forcement-related use of information obtained through the programs
should be permissible as a means of remedying the executive
overreach involved in establishing the programs themselves. Any
314. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (“[W]hen a plea rests in any
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be
part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.”); Stolt-Nielsen, S.A.
v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) (“It is ... well established that the Govern-
ment must adhere strictly to the terms of agreements made with defendants—including plea,
cooperation, and immunity agreements—to the extent the agreements require defendants to
sacrifice constitutional rights.”).
315. See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding
the voluntariness of a confession despite police deception); United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d
815, 817 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a confession
inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in custodial ones as well, unless
government agents make threats or promises.”).
1006 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:937
such argument, however, overlooks the other side of the reliance
balance—the aim, reflected in the Raley-Cox-PICCO trilogy and its
progeny, to avoid especially sharp forms of individual entrapment.
As emphasized earlier, the reliance question requires an inquiry
that is distinct from the question of executive authority. Even if
DACA and DAPA were substantively unlawful, the remedy for their
illegality was simply to cancel the programs themselves. The
immigration violations in question, after all, were preexisting rather
than invited by the government policy itself. It would thus be
perverse if the government came out ahead in its enforcement
efforts by virtue of having adopted an unlawful program. At the
least, immigrants who did nothing wrong by applying for a
government-proffered form of relief should not bear the cost of
government illegality. Accordingly, should the Trump Administra-
tion or another future President begin deporting DACA and DAPA
beneficiaries, courts should hold that due process bars removal
unless the government can demonstrate that it became aware of an
immigrant’s unlawful presence by means other than the immi-
grant’s own deferred action application and other information
provided pursuant to the resulting work authorization.
Looking beyond immigration, similar analysis should apply when-
ever the government invites disclosure of damning information with
explicit assurances about how the information will be used. As just
one example, a formal policy of the Department of Justice promises
leniency to corporations that self-report certain antitrust violations
before other participants in a putative conspiracy do so.316 Reliance
on this policy or other similar programs should receive due process
protection in appropriate cases. In administrative contexts, indeed,
courts have understood the APA’s prohibition on “arbitrary and
capricious” government action to bar such whipsaws. The Eighth
Circuit, for example, held recently that the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration could not lawfully depart in a particular case from a
previously announced policy of declining punitive enforcement with
respect to certain self-reported safety violations if the reporting par-
ty subsequently agreed to a “comprehensive fix” for the problem.317
316. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (1993), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/08/14/0091.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GK4-L4EH].
317. GoJet Airlines, LLC v. FAA, 743 F.3d 1168, 1173 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the
policy in question “imposes binding limitations on how the agency will thereafter exercise its
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By the same token, departing from promised limits on the use of
damning information may sometimes present an unconstitutionally
arbitrary exercise of enforcement discretion.
The same principles should also prevent federal use of informa-
tion obtained by state authorities in reliance on a federal nonen-
forcement policy. Current marijuana policy raises this particular
problem. To obtain required licenses or otherwise qualify for state
permission to sell marijuana, businesses must often provide signif-
icant information about their activities and transactions to state
authorities. As Robert Mikos has observed, federal law enforcement
officials have claimed authority to obtain such information from
state officials through administrative or grand jury subpoenas.318
Professor Mikos argues that such compelled production of state
information violates constitutional federalism principles; in his
view, requiring states to produce these records is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court’s holding in Printz v. United States that federal
officials may not “commandeer” state assistance with federal law
enforcement.319
Whether or not Professor Mikos’s view is correct as a general
matter, and even in contexts in which the commandeering doctrine
is inapplicable because state officials voluntarily provide informa-
tion, due process provides a further reason to bar such federal
action. In documenting their illegal activity for state authorities,
marijuana entrepreneurs have relied not only on the legality of their
activity under state law, but also on federal assurances that the
federal violations to which they were effectively confessing would
not be prosecuted. Much as with DAPA and DACA applications,
precluding federal use of this information carries some cost to
federal statutory objectives, as it deprives executive officials of one
tool that would facilitate enforcement. Yet the effect is attenuated
insofar as the government may nonetheless pursue primary viola-
tions on its own, provided it does so the old-fashioned way: through
gumshoe investigation by its own personnel.
In short, although information gathering is essential to all law
enforcement, a due process defense should sometimes bar access to
enforcement discretion”).
318. Mikos, supra note 302, at 115-20 (collecting cases).
319. Id. at 158-59; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997).
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the most easily obtainable information if regulated parties provided
such information in reliance on assurances that the law would not
be enforced against them as a result of their disclosure.
2. Secondary Violations
Plausible claims of indirect reliance might also arise with respect
to legal prohibitions that clearly exist only to add force to some more
primary prohibition that executive officials indicated they were
unlikely to enforce.
This question, too, has arisen concretely as a result of recent
policies. The federal Controlled Substances Act, for example, not
only prohibits possession and distribution of controlled sub-
stances—including marijuana—but also specifically prohibits
knowingly and intentionally leasing or otherwise making property
available for use in drug operations.320 The government has
accordingly threatened landlords with criminal prosecution, civil
penalties, or forfeiture based on tenants’ operation of illegal
businesses, including state-licensed marijuana dispensaries, on
their property.321 In at least one marijuana case, the defendants
320. The statute provides as follows: 
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful to—
(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, whether
permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or
using any controlled substance;
(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily, either
as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly
and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or
without compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing,
storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2012). Violations may result in civil or criminal penalties, as well as civil
forfeiture. Id. § 856(b)-(e).
Courts have upheld convictions against landlords and other similarly situated parties
under this provision. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“[U]nder § 856(a)(2), the person who manages or controls the building and then rents to
others, need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug related activity take place;
rather such activity is engaged in by others (i.e., others have the purpose).” (quoting United
States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990))); United States v. Tamez, 941 F.2d 770, 774
(9th Cir. 1991) (upholding conviction of owner of used-car dealership where cocaine dealing
occurred because “section 856(a)(2) requires only that proscribed activity was present, [and]
that [the defendant] knew of the activity and allowed that activity to continue”).
321. See, e.g., Ziggy1 Corp. v. Lynch, 123 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1314-16 (W.D. Okla. 2015)
(describing Drug Enforcement Agency threats to landlords of alleged drug paraphernalia
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asserted a due process defense, which the court at the time rejected
based on the noncommittal character of the government’s nonen-
forcement assurances.322 At the time, the very fact of continued
federal enforcement likely made claims of legitimate confusion and
reliance untenable. Yet the Justice Department’s nonenforcement
policy later expanded and sharpened into more consistent disregard
for primary marijuana violations; it is now even partially codified in
an appropriations rider.323 As nonenforcement continues to harden,
the balance should eventually tip in favor of protecting reliance on
the part of landlords and other indirect violators.
Much as with information disclosure, individual reliance interests
are acute in this context, as landlords and others may come to
perceive entering leases or other contracts with marijuana dispensa-
ries as no different from doing so with respect to other ostensibly
lawful businesses. On the other side of the balance, moreover, the
separation of powers costs to protecting reliance are attenuated
given the government’s ability to vindicate statutory policies by
pursuing those who have violated the law more directly. 
Congress, of course, enacts secondary violations in part to deprive
those who would engage in primary violations of necessary support
and infrastructure. Accordingly, just as with denying access to
available information, taking these offenses off the table carries
some cost to executive officials’ authority (and responsibility) to
faithfully execute statutory policies. What is more, in some contexts,
distinguishing between primary and secondary offenses may be
conceptually incoherent: Congress may prohibit some conduct for its
own sake, even if proscribing that conduct also makes engaging in
other proscribed conduct more difficult.
Nevertheless, when, as in this example, a relatively clear
distinction may be drawn, the balance between fairness consider-
ations and separation of powers may sometimes tip in favor of
protecting reliance. Here, the reasonableness inquiry in evaluating
such defenses might appropriately be fine-grained, taking account
business); Marin All. for Med. Marijuana v. Holder, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1146 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (addressing challenge to threatened prosecution against landlords and others associated
with marijuana dispensaries operating in compliance with state law). 
322. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, 866 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56 (addressing claimed
reliance on 2009 Ogden Marijuana Guidance).
323. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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in particular of the circumstances and legal sophistication of
affected private parties. At one end of the spectrum, highly sophisti-
cated, well-lawyered parties such as banks or large-scale commer-
cial landlords might be expected to understand the legal risks they
were taking by leasing or otherwise assisting marijuana businesses,
notwithstanding the government’s enforcement guidance. At the
other end, small-time landowners and operators of support busi-
nesses might much more plausibly claim confusion with respect to
the government’s assurances. Even if reliance should not be
protected across the board, in suitably compelling cases the claim of
individual unfairness should prevail over countervailing separation
of powers concerns about executive licensing of unlawful conduct.
C. Congressional Nonenforcement
A further implication of my analysis is that courts should
recognize broader reliance defenses with respect to congressionally
mandated nonenforcement, as opposed to nonenforcement adopted
by enforcement agencies on their own initiative. If anxieties about
enabling executive dispensations from substantive law properly
explain courts’ reluctance to recognize reliance defenses based on
nonenforcement decisions, courts should be more solicitous of
individual fairness concerns—and thus more willing to recognize
legal protections for reliance—when such separation of powers
anxieties are inapplicable because Congress, rather than the
executive branch alone, has mandated the nonenforcement.
This category is hardly a null set. As noted, Congress has
repeatedly adopted an appropriations rider barring use of Justice
Department funds “to prevent [listed states] from implementing
their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana.”324 Although the Justice Depart-
ment has argued that this rider prevents only prosecution of state
officials, not private parties operating in compliance with state
324. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 542, 129 Stat. 2242,
2333 (2015); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-
235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130, 2217 (2014) (including a similar restriction); see also Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-53, § 103, 129 Stat. 502, 506 (2015) (extending force
of § 538 with respect to continuing appropriations).
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law,325 the Ninth Circuit recently held that the rider establishes a
judicially enforceable bar to any prosecution of state-compliant
possession or distribution of medical marijuana.326 Congress has
used this same tactic to control administrative action in other
contexts. To give just one current example, a recurrent appropria-
tions rider denies federal funding to “implement or enforce” certain
statutory energy-efficiency requirements for light bulbs.327 One
scholar counted over 200 such enforcement bans in reported House
appropriations bills between 1993 and 2002.328
Such congressionally mandated nonenforcement, no less than its
agency-initiated counterpart, may present significant reliance
concerns, particularly in areas of regulation like marijuana
enforcement in which social cues may be more important than
formal legal restrictions in determining behavior. For example,
under the Ninth Circuit’s reading, the current medical marijuana
enforcement ban will effectively create an environment in which
participants in state-approved medical marijuana dispensaries may
perceive their activity as risk-free. After all, nonenforcement is
likely to be more total and categorical when it derives from a
judicially enforceable limit on executive authority. Furthermore,
whatever the risk of confusion when prosecutors independently halt
enforcement, that risk seems likely to be greater still if regulated
parties perceive (even mistakenly) that Congress has excused their
325. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing Justice
Department’s interpretation).
326. Id. at 1172-73. Some courts have rejected rider-based defenses when the conduct in
question in fact violated state law. See, e.g., United States v. Firestack-Harvey, No. 13-CR-00-
24-TOR-1, 2015 WL 3533222, at *1 (E.D. Wash. June 4, 2015); United States v. Silkeutsabay,
No. 13-CR-0140-TOR-1, 2015 WL 2376170, at *2 (E.D. Wash. May 18, 2015), appeal filed, No.
15-30392 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2015); cf. United States v. Tote, No. 1:14-MJ-00212-SAB, 2015 WL
3732010, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2015) (noting that defendant’s apparent driving under the
influence of marijuana violated state law, though charge at issue alleged only possession).
327. See, e.g., § 313, 128 Stat. at 2326 (denying use of funds “to implement or enforce the
standards established ... with respect to BPAR incandescent reflector lamps, BR incandescent
reflector lamps, and ER incandescent reflector lamps”); Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 315, 125 Stat. 786, 879 (2011) (same).
328. Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic
Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766, 768 (2010). For reasons I intend to elaborate in
future work, I assume here that Congress holds authority to restrict enforcement through
appropriations limitations. For a contrary view, see Jacques B. LeBoeuf, Limitations on the
Use of Appropriations Riders by Congress to Effectuate Substantive Policy Changes, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 475 (1992).
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conduct. Anyone who has sped on the highway without getting
stopped likely understands the basic concept of prosecutorial
discretion—that law enforcement officials hold no obligation to
punish every legal violation, even if the conduct in question is
technically illegal. In all likelihood, the distinction between
appropriations and substantive legislation is far less familiar to the
average citizen.
At any rate, even if the risk of misplaced individual reliance is
only equivalent (and not still greater), the central rationale for
limiting reliance defenses—concern about shortchanging “the
interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of
law”329—is effectively absent when Congress, rather than an
enforcement agency, has mandated the policy. Congress, of course,
could change the law if it wished; limiting reliance is not necessary
to protect Congress’s ultimate control over substantive legality.
Limiting reliance on congressionally mandated nonenforcement
instead serves only to protect Congress’s ability to ban enforcement
of laws without changing their substantive content.
Enforcement bans, to be sure, may advance important interests.
For one thing, appropriations limits provide an important mecha-
nism for legislative control of executive policy. Although some
commentators have worried that the appropriations process is prone
to gamesmanship and special-interest giveaways, in principle
including policy overrides in must-pass annual appropriations bills
may give Congress leverage to insist on policies the President would
otherwise veto.330 Appropriations limits may thus provide a key
congressional check on exercises of previously delegated administra-
tive authority. At the same time, because appropriations bills are
drafted through a less transparent and deliberative process, House
and Senate rules limit substantive legal provisions in such legisla-
tion.331 For the same reason, courts presume that ambiguous
329. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60 (1984).
330. See MacDonald, supra note 328, at 767.
331. House rules direct that “[a] provision changing existing law may not be reported in a
general appropriation bill” and that “[a]n amendment to a general appropriation bill shall not
be in order if changing existing law.” RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 114TH
CONG., R. XXI(2)(b)-(c) (2015), https://rules.house.gov/sites/republicans.rules.house.gov/files/
114/PDF/House-Rules-114.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR7S-K599]. The Senate’s standing rules
similarly provide that a point of order may be made against a reported appropriations bill
“containing amendments to such bill proposing new or general legislation” and that “no
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appropriations legislation does not effect any change in substantive
law.332 Riders aimed at limiting executive action thus are likely to
take the form of enforcement bans rather than substantive legal
changes. As noted, however, choice of form may cause particular
confusion on the part of regulated parties. To the extent it does,
practical concerns about the integrity of the appropriations process
would provide weak justification for disregarding regulated parties’
mistaken reliance. Indeed, insofar as appropriations riders take the
form of enforcement bans rather than substantive legal changes
only because that route affords the path of least resistance,
protecting individual reliance in some circumstances might well
advance, rather than thwart, Congress’s likely policy goals in
adopting the legislation in the first place.
Congress might also choose to enact appropriations limits as a
way of hitting the “pause” button on a substantive policy while
continuing to consider the policy’s merits. Halting enforcement with
respect to medical marijuana, for example, might enable state
experiments to proceed while Congress considers whether to enact
more general legal reforms. Relatedly, an enforcement ban might
reflect congressional intent to calibrate enforcement without
changing substantive law. Congress might wish to limit current
criminal prosecution of medical marijuana while nonetheless
maintaining some deterrent limits on marijuana dispensaries. In
other words, Congress might seek to strike a balance by limiting
current prosecution but maintaining threatened (but uncertain)
future enforcement, along with any ancillary legal disabilities or
opportunities for private enforcement (such as through civil RICO
suits) that result from continued criminalization.
amendment ... which proposes general legislation shall be received to any general appropri-
ation bill.” STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, R. XVI(2), (4), at 11 (2013).
Neal Devins argues that “attempting to separate the process of funding from other lawmaking
processes” is “a sensible means of ensuring that congressional decisionmaking is deliberate
and systematic.” Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 458.
332. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (“When voting on
appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to operate under the assumption that the
funds will be devoted to purposes which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. Without
such an assurance, every appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of
altering substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute which might
prohibit the expenditure.”).
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These possible rationales again fail to provide a cogent justifica-
tion for overriding otherwise compelling individual reliance
interests. Congress may well prefer to keep its options open, but due
process should limit its ability to do so in ways that risk significant
confusion and resulting problems of fair notice for regulated parties.
Congress, after all, could not pass retroactive criminal legislation;
any such law would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.333 But if a
current enforcement ban risks fostering a good-faith perception of
legality (however mistaken) among regulated parties, allowing
enforcement to spring back—with respect to past as well as future
conduct—would amount in effect to ex post facto criminalization of
conduct that Congress itself sought to encourage. Due process
principles of fair dealing reflected in Raley, Cox, and PICCO should
preclude this result.
Reliance defenses, then, should hold broader scope with respect
to congressionally mandated nonenforcement than with respect to
agency-initiated nonenforcement. But where exactly should the line
be drawn? Given that Congress may have sound reasons for
proceeding through appropriations rather than substantive legal
changes, a blanket estoppel rule would be inappropriate. Courts
should instead consider reliance claims case-by-case based on an
assessment of reasonableness under the circumstances. In other
words, as is generally true with respect to claims of fundamental
fairness or equitable estoppel, the inquiry should be fact-specific and
context-dependent; it should turn ultimately on the degree to which
regulated parties may credibly claim a good-faith belief that
Congress had authorized their conduct.334 Reliance claims will
generally be far more credible when presented by legally unsophisti-
cated parties such as small-time marijuana dispensaries than with
respect to well-lawyered participants in heavily regulated indus-
tries. By the same token, reliance interests will be strongest when,
as in the case of the current medical marijuana rider, Congress and
the executive branch were in basic agreement about appropriate
policy at the time of the ban, notwithstanding their failure to
333. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990).
334. Cf. Heckler, 467 U.S. at 59 (observing that “[e]stoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked
to avoid injustice in particular cases” and that “a hallmark of the doctrine is its flexible
application”).
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change the substantive law itself.335 In contrast, in circumstances of
inter-branch conflict, such as appropriations riders barring enforce-
ment of new substantive regulations, the executive branch might
undercut claims of reasonable reliance by specifically signaling to
regulated parties that it intends to resume enforcement, even with
respect to conduct occurring while the rider is in effect, if Congress
restores appropriations.336
In sum, although existing case law has generally distinguished
between misleading statements of law and assurances of nonen-
forcement, the central rationale for limiting reliance defenses in this
fashion is a concern about precluding unauthorized executive can-
cellation of substantive legal obligations. Because that concern is
absent when nonenforcement results from congressional legislation
rather than executive policy, courts should give broader protection
to individual reliance interests in this context. Congress may have
reasons of its own for choosing to limit enforcement rather than
changing the law itself, but those reasons do not justify imposing
after-the-fact penalties on regulated parties legitimately confused
by Congress’s apparent encouragement of formally prohibited
conduct.
D. Policy-Based Desuetude
A last possible exception to legal limits on reliance should permit
a due process defense when an overt nonenforcement policy has
persisted without change or apparent violation over an extended
335. See 2013 Cole Marijuana Enforcement Guidance, supra note 2.
336. The recent decision in United States v. Tote may provide an example in which a due
process defense would be appropriate on this account. See No. 1:14-MJ-00212-SAB, 2015 WL
3732010 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2015). In that case, the defendant was arrested by Forest Service
police for driving under the influence in a national forest. Id. at *1. Although he claimed to
hold valid medical authorization to possess marijuana under state law, federal prosecutors
charged him criminally with marijuana possession. Id. The court declined to dismiss the
charge based on the appropriations restriction. Id. at *3. The Ninth Circuit has since held that
appropriations restrictions bar current prosecution, see United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d
1163, 1176-78 (9th Cir. 2016), but the Ninth Circuit’s decision suggested that prosecution
could resume if Congress later made funds available. See id. at 1179 n.5 (“Congress could
restore funding tomorrow, a year from now, or four years from now, and the government could
then prosecute individuals who committed offenses while the government lacked funding.”).
On the theory advocated here, due process could preclude renewed prosecution for individuals
like the defendant in Tote even after Congress restored funding to pursue such cases.
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period of time. As we have seen, the balance between separation of
powers compliance and individual reliance generally must favor the
former at the expense of the latter, so as to avoid creating an
executive suspending power by operation of due process.337 At some
point, however, the balance should tip the other way, at least with
respect to malum prohibitum offenses like drug prohibition. If the
government effectively creates a settled expectation of legality by
adhering over a lengthy period to an overt policy of nonenforcement,
due process should eventually bar retrospective enforcement in
violation of the policy—notwithstanding the significant cost to
congressional lawmaking authority that results from this rule.
This proposal would in effect create a narrow doctrine of “desue-
tude,” under which substantive laws would lose force (at least
retrospectively) by virtue of longstanding overt nonenforcement.
Desuetude, in the sense used here, refers to a proposed “doctrine by
which a legislative enactment is judicially abrogated following a
long period of intentional nonenforcement and notorious
disregard.”338 The doctrine is a favorite among academics: a number
of prominent scholars have advocated precluding any enforcement
of a given substantive law if enforcement officials have brought no
prosecutions (or no analogous prosecutions) for an extended
period.339 As justification for such proposals, scholars have argued
that longstanding nonenforcement implies a lapse in democratic
support for the law itself, making it fundamentally unfair to impose
the prohibition on individual defendants without further legislative
action to renew the law’s force.340 Such proposals may also draw
strength from due process principles of fair notice. Longstanding
nonenforcement, after all, may deprive individuals of genuine
warning that their conduct is unlawful.
337. See supra Part II.A.1.
338. Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2210 (2006); see also Comm. on Legal Ethics
of the W. Va. State Bar v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720, 726 (W. Va. 1992) (recognizing desuetude
defense where crime in question is malum prohibitum, violations have been “open, notorious,
and pervasive,” and the government has followed “a conspicuous policy of nonenforcement”).
339. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 18-19 (1982);
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 63-64 (1961); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,
100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 591-93 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of
Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27, 49-50.
340. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 339, at 49-50.
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Federal courts have nevertheless failed to embrace a broad
desuetude defense, and separation of powers concerns almost
certainly explain why.341 As one critic observes,
Sometimes laws are rarely enforced because of a prosecutorial
policy to concentrate limited resources elsewhere. Other times
laws are not “enforced” because there are no lawbreakers. And
still other times they are not enforced because while there may
be plenty of lawbreakers, there is little or no evidence of the
violations.342
Without a clear indication that the persistence of an unenforced law
reflects a breakdown of the political process, courts may well
hesitate to wipe away substantive prohibitions adopted by past
legislatures.
The narrower due process limit proposed here may better thread
the needle between individual fairness and legislative impairment.
To be sure, any doctrine that converts enforcement practice into an
effective enforcement prohibition raises the same separation of
powers concern highlighted throughout this Article: in effect, such
desuetude doctrines enable choices made by the executive branch
alone to alter the content of substantive laws without any affirma-
tive legislative delegation authorizing executive officials to do so.
Some might thus argue that longstanding executive defiance of
statutory policy should make it more, rather than less, important to
maintain the ultimate enforceability of underlying substantive laws.
Yet if longstanding adherence potentially magnifies a nonenforce-
ment policy’s separation of powers cost, it may also greatly magnify
the unfairness to any individuals who face enforcement after being
lulled into a false sense of security by the policy’s longevity.
What is more, the policy’s transparency and longevity may
provide particular reason to doubt the underlying substantive law’s
continued democratic legitimacy. When enforcement practice is
never formalized, courts may lack confidence that the asserted
341. See generally Note, Desuetude, supra note 338, at 2213.
342. Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Law
Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2207, 2216 n.13 (2006) (reviewing CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR
AMERICA (2005)).
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practice reflects definite public dissatisfaction with the law itself, as
opposed to one or more other factors that may lead particular laws
to be under-enforced. Formal announcement of a policy, in contrast,
suggests at least some political support for mitigating the law’s
reach. At the same time, as recent controversies over DACA and
DAPA illustrate, overt nonenforcement policies may provide a focus
for political opposition, as well as potential opportunities for judicial
review.343
For all these reasons, courts may have relatively stronger
confidence that a policy renewed over time by repeated administra-
tions—particularly administrations from different political parties—
reflects weakened democratic support for the underlying law itself.
Limiting desuetude to contexts of transparent nonenforcement,
moreover, would preclude reliance on de facto nonenforcement poli-
cies, like the long neglect of federal civil rights enforcement during
the Jim Crow era,344 that are too shameful to be publicly acknowl-
edged. At any rate, were courts to embrace this variety of desuetude,
they could preserve the substantive law’s ultimate validity by
allowing prospective enforcement following an announced change in
policy. Just as courts have sought to limit “unfair surprise” with
respect to enforcement of administrative statutes by allowing
significant changes in policy to operate only prospectively,345 so too
here courts might protect individual reliance on longstanding
nonenforcement policies by holding the government to its past poli-
cy with respect to past conduct.
How long a period should be sufficient to trigger this limited form
of desuetude? Although one might advocate a longer or shorter
period, I will here arbitrarily propose that after any such policy
remains in effect for fifteen years or more, the burden should shift
to the government to demonstrate continued enforcement in
comparable cases. Nonenforcement over so long a time period is
likely to prompt quite substantial reliance, perhaps even a perceived
virtual certainty of immunity from punishment. Just imagine, for
example, how entrenched the marijuana industry will likely appear
343. For my views on the reviewability of nonenforcement policies, see generally Price, Law
Enforcement as Political Question, supra note 29.
344. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
345. See supra Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168-69 (2012);
supra Part II.A.3.
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in states like Colorado if current federal enforcement guidelines
remain in place, without change or salient examples of enforcement,
for another decade. A fifteen-year period, moreover, would necessar-
ily cover multiple changes in presidency, including in all likelihood
(given historic political cycles) one or more changes in partisan
control of the White House.346 It would thus provide courts with
substantial assurance of democratic support for the policy reflected
in the enforcement practice, as distinct from the underlying statute.
To be sure, so long a period would also provide ample opportunity
for congressional action. But at least if Congress has not actively
resisted the policy, courts should hesitate to draw the negative
inference that congressional failure to ratify it suggests implicit
disapproval. One of nonenforcement’s many troubling features is
that by limiting effective burdens on regulated parties, nonenforce-
ment may also relieve political pressure on Congress to update the
underlying substantive laws themselves.347 Congressional inaction
may thus provide only a weak indication of actual public prefer-
ences.
In any event, if the policy has persisted over a long enough period
of time, concerns about individual reliance should eventually
override concerns about protecting legislative authority. Such legal
protection for reliance, indeed, should be obtained without regard to
whether the policy itself was substantively appropriate or even
lawful. The Raley-Cox-PICCO anti-entrapment defense, after all,
may protect reliance even on incorrect statements of law. There was
no actual privilege against self-incrimination at the hearing in
Raley, but the defendants were nonetheless entitled to rely on
assurances that asserting the privilege was lawful.348
While the Trump Administration seems likely to end DACA and
DAPA,349 this desuetude proposal has straightforward implications
for the current marijuana controversy. If current enforcement policy
persists for a lengthy period, across multiple administrations, and
if Congress at the same time fails to take more decisive action either
in favor of the policy or in opposition to it, the government should
346. See DOUGLAS CLOUATRE, PRESIDENTIAL UPSETS 4 (2013) (“Twelve or more years of
same-party control of the White House has occurred only five times since the 1830s.”).
347. See Stuntz, supra note 339, at 591.
348. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 441-42 (1959).
349. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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eventually be disabled from enforcing criminal marijuana prohibi-
tions against parties who acted in reliance on the policy.
Reliance concerns may in fact apply with particular force to many
intended beneficiaries of the Obama Administration’s marijuana
policy.350 While participants in heavily regulated industries and
other legally sophisticated parties can perhaps be expected to
understand legal risks associated with participating in a given
program or relying on particular administrative guidance, the
typical small-time marijuana entrepreneur can hardly be charged
with assessing the legal strength of objections to programs endorsed
by senior officials and embraced by thousands of similarly situated
people. If in the short run potentially overriding such individuals’
reliance interests is a necessary (though troubling) means of
cabining unlawful executive action, in the long run—as reliance
grows more entrenched and executive policy gains legitimacy from
duration—the balance should tip in favor of protecting reliance.
IV. FIRST-BEST SOLUTIONS FOR A SECOND-BEST WORLD
Through the proposals just offered, the balancing framework as
I have elaborated it may provide some opportunity at the margins
to mitigate harsh effects of the general rule that nonenforcement
reliance cannot receive constitutional protection. It bears reiterat-
ing, however, that the tradeoffs involved in balancing fairness and
separation of powers are necessarily messy and contestable; the
inquiry carries the inevitable imprecision of all incommensurate
balancing tests.351 Yet the very difficulty of the inquiry leads to a
more fundamental observation: that nonenforcement is a highly
problematic means of negotiating political and social conflicts over
the merits of existing law. 
Nonenforcement, to be sure, has the appealing feature of
forbearing from applying potentially harsh measures to sympathetic
defendants; in that sense, it provides an important safety valve for
outdated laws. Yet because nonenforcement assurances generally
350. See 2011 Cole Medical Marijuana Guidance, supra note 2; Ogden Marijuana Guidance,
supra note 2; DAPA Memo, supra note 6; DACA Memo, supra note 6.
351. See Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (pointing out the imprecision of a balancing test applied to the
dormant Commerce Clause).
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are not—and cannot be—binding, assertive use of nonenforcement
policy, particularly in areas of political contestation such as
marijuana, immigration, gun control, or environmental protection,
may amount to playing chicken with subsequent administrations,
daring them to disrupt the practical reliance interests that have
built up around the outgoing administration’s policy.352 Presumably,
in most cases, the game will go just fine; the political process will
protect sympathetic beneficiaries’ reliance on policies with majority
support. But chicken sometimes ends in a crash. Indeed, in the
current presidential transition, with respect to immigration at least,
we may well be headed towards a quite sharp reversal and potential
disruption of expectations.
For this reason, among others, nonenforcement policy itself is
very much a second-best solution for addressing outdated and
inequitable laws. Executive officials may well judge that the second-
best solution is the best they can do in our second-best world, rife
with partisan conflict and often beset by legislative paralysis. But
the reliance problems such policies generate should remind us how
much better the first-best solutions can be. And there are other
possibilities. With respect to criminal laws, Presidents hold the clear
alternative of employing constitutional clemency powers to mitigate
laws they disfavor.353 In particular areas of federal law, statutes
may also provide particular mechanisms for adjusting the substan-
tive scope of legal prohibitions.354 Finally, of course, Congress itself
might devote more attention to conforming past laws to current
public preferences, or it might consider delegating broader executive
authority to do so.355
A. The Clemency Alternative
How might clemency provide an alternative to nonenforcement?
The Constitution gives the President the specific “Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States,
except in Cases of Impeachment.”356 Although historically “pardons
352. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
353. See infra Part IV.A.
354. See infra Part IV.B.
355. See infra Part IV.C.
356. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
1022 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:937
and reprieves” were specific forms of clemency, serving respectively
to excuse a completed offense or delay imposition of adjudicated
punishment, the Supreme Court has understood this clause to
provide authority for the full range of traditional types of clemency,
including commutations (reductions in punishment) and amnesties
(general pardons for specified offenses).357 The Court has also held
that clemency “releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by
the offence, and restores to him all his civil rights. In contemplation
of law, it so far blots out the offence, that afterwards it cannot be
imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights.”358 Thus,
while a pardon may not impair previously vested property rights or
require return of fines or other sums paid into the U.S. Treasury,359
an unconditional pardon eliminates collateral penalties and
disabilities that result directly from commission of the crime or from
criminal conviction.360
Pardons, to be sure, are normally issued on an individualized
basis following lengthy consideration of a particular application.361
As Rachel Barkow has observed, however, some Presidents have
issued pardons systematically to expunge entire categories of
violations.362 Indeed, some have even done so on a class-wide basis
through a general amnesty.363 Most recently, President Carter
issued a proclamation in 1977 pardoning, with certain specified
exceptions, “all persons who may have committed any offense
between August 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973 in violation of the
Military Selective Service Act or any rule or regulation promulgated
thereunder,” including those convicted of such offenses.364 Such
general amnesties have most often covered political offenses and
357. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561,
570, 580 (2001).
358. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877).
359. Id. at 154.
360. See Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 867-68, 867 n.360 (2015); Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and
Immigration Law, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 327-31 (2010).
361. See Barkow, supra note 360, at 811.
362. Id. at 836-37; see also Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic
Presidential Pardons, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139, 139-40 (2000-2001).
363. See Barkow, supra note 360, at 811 & n.40, 813 n.62, 837.
364. Proclamation No. 4483, 42 Fed. Reg. 4391 (Jan. 21, 1977), reprinted in 91 Stat. 1719
(1977); see also Exec. Order No. 11,967, 42 Fed. Reg. 4393 (1977) (directing measures to
implement pardons).
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rebellions rather than ordinary domestic crimes.365 But the Supreme
Court has doubted whether the labeling of different forms of
clemency carries “legal importance” as opposed to mere “philological
interest.”366 In any event, even if some individualized pardoning
process is required, historic precedents could support issuing such
pardons systematically to achieve consistent policy results.367
Though President Obama did not pursue this option, such historic
actions could have provided a model for protecting reliance on the
his Administration’s marijuana nonenforcement policy in a way that
due process defenses cannot.
Pardons are often more politically costly than nonenforcement.
While an enforcement policy is always subject to revision, a pardon’s
effects are irrevocable,368 and the President must own the choice to
excuse conduct that is concededly criminal. The government,
moreover, cannot later use pardoned crimes as proxies for other
more dangerous behavior or as leverage in plea bargains—reasons
for which marijuana or immigration offenses might otherwise be
charged in particular cases. Clemency, finally, can operate only ret-
rospectively, with respect to completed violations;369 an announced
nonenforcement policy, in contrast, may encourage behavior ahead
of time by altering perceptions of legal risk.370 Nevertheless, for
much the same reasons, clemency also provides greater security to
those who benefit from it. What is more, clemency, unlike nonen-
forcement, rests on an undeniable constitutional power of the
Executive.371 Presidents should consider using this power more
broadly in areas of law, like marijuana prohibition, where Congress
has proven unresponsive to apparent public preferences regarding
the proper scope of criminal prohibitions.
365. See Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 94-95 (1915) (observing that an amnesty
“is usually, addressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the state, to political offenses,
forgiveness being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecution and
punishment”); cf. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877) (“[T]he term [amnesty] is
generally employed where pardon is extended to whole classes or communities, instead of
individuals.”).
366. Knote, 95 U.S. at 153.
367. See Barkow, supra note 360, at 836-38; Shanor & Miller, supra note 362, at 142.
368. See Barkow, supra note 360, at 812.
369. See Hoffstadt, supra note 357, at 570 n.37.
370. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (D. Mont.), adhered
to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 4602838 (D. Mont. Oct. 2, 2012).
371. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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B. Administrative Authorities
Because the pardon power extends only to criminal violations,
presidential clemency cannot help directly in areas of civil or
administrative regulation.372 Nevertheless, particular statutory
contexts might provide alternative means of adjusting legal
prohibitions. The options available in each particular area will vary,
and such legal remedies will rarely provide authority to alter
substantive law to the degree executive officials might wish. But
such is life in a government bound by law. To the extent such
solutions are available, they too may provide a degree of security
that would otherwise be quite lacking. For that reason, though, they
may be worth the effort and political cost, even if nonenforcement
appears to be a path of less resistance.
C. Congress’s Role
Finally, Congress might consider devoting more energy to
updating old laws. In particular, instead of relying on appropria-
tions riders to restrict enforcement, Congress should more often
consider suspending the underlying laws themselves. Doing so
would provide greater security to regulated parties, avoid the
problems of confusion addressed above, and provide greater clarity
as to Congress’s ultimate preferences. By avoiding confusion about
Congress’s desired policy, moreover, such action would render
Congress more readily accountable for its policy decisions.
With respect to marijuana in particular, Congress should consider
adopting such legislation for the same reasons that President
Obama might have considered executive clemency. Again, enforce-
ment bans may often be more politically feasible than either of these
alternatives. But legislators should recognize the significant risks
of confusion and mistaken reliance that enforcement bans create for
regulated parties. If what Congress truly intends by an enforcement
ban is a suspension of the substantive law itself, it should enact
legislation making that intent clear.
More broadly, Congress should consider developing mechanisms
for updating statutory restrictions over time through means other
372. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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than enforcement discretion. Two leading scholars have argued that
Congress effectively elevated front-end enforcement policy’s
centrality to immigration law by closing down opportunities for
more formal, back-end relief for removable immigrants.373 In many
areas of law, Congress holds powerful incentives to engage in this
form of duplicitous lawmaking—adopting tough substantive laws
while relying on enforcement discretion to better align those laws in
application with actual public preferences.374
But this sort of legal structure is troubling: it gives enforcement
officials too much unguided discretion to determine the law on the
ground, while at the same time limiting Congress’s accountability
for the true breadth of the laws it has adopted.375 Some degree of
enforcement discretion may enable enforcement officials to adapt
laws over time to new realities and leverage limited enforcement
resources to achieve maximum compliance. But in general, provid-
ing affirmative authority to waive legal restrictions ahead of time
would afford greater security to regulated parties and greater clarity
about executive policy, while at the same time avoiding questions of
legal authority that have surrounded DACA, DAPA, and the
marijuana guidance.
In the present moment, unified Republican control of the
presidency and both Houses of Congress will provide substantial
opportunity for legal reform. No doubt Republican leaders will
concentrate on a familiar Republican deregulatory wish list, to the
dismay of their political opponents. Yet Congress should also take
the opportunity to adjust federal laws such as marijuana prohibi-
tions and other over-broad criminal statutes that have outlasted
their political support.
To the extent Congress lacks the political bandwidth to address
the matter itself, it might also delegate authority to the executive
branch to suspend existing statutes. For example, with respect to
marijuana, Congress might consider delegating authority to adjust
the scope of federal marijuana prohibitions in light of evolving state-
level legal regimes. Some have raised constitutional concerns about
373. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 59, at 132.
374. See generally Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative
Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 40-48 (2008) (discussing those incentives).
375. See Stuntz, supra note 339, at 547-48.
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legislation delegating authority to cancel legal obligations,376 and
the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating a line-item veto statute
in Clinton v. City of New York could suggest such delegation is
impermissible.377 For reasons I and others have addressed else-
where, however, constitutional objections to this form of negative
delegation are mistaken.378 Provided Congress includes an intelligi-
ble principle sufficient to satisfy the current (highly permissive)
judicial understanding of the nondelegation doctrine,379 delegated
authority to suspend laws should not present any greater constitu-
tional difficulty than the now-routine delegation of authority to
create effective legal obligations.
* * * 
Executive or legislative suspensions of enforcement may provide
a powerful mechanism for adjusting the effective scope of disfavored
or outdated laws. But insofar as they suspend only enforcement and
not the laws themselves, such actions necessarily leave regulated
parties in jeopardy of future sanctions for conduct that enforcement
officials or legislators (or both) effectively encouraged. The due
process principles addressed here may help avoid some of the worst
effects that such enforcement suspensions create, but countervailing
separation of powers considerations necessarily limit the effective
scope of these defenses. Both Congress and the President should use
the powers they have to provide greater security to regulated parties
whom they themselves invited to violate the law.
CONCLUSION
Recent marijuana and immigration nonenforcement policies have
raised a reliance problem that may arise across a range of contexts,
and that may well arise in still more acute forms in the future if the
376. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 126-28 (2014).
377. See 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
378. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 265, 312-18 (2013); Daniel T. Deacon, Administrative Forbearance, 125 YALE L.J. 1548,
1564-67 (2016); Price, Enforcement Discretion, supra note 29, at 673-75; Price, supra note 87,
at 259-62.
379. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
2017] RELIANCE ON NONENFORCEMENT 1027
Obama Administration’s marijuana and immigration policies
provide a model for similarly extensive policies in other politically
contested areas of law. Drawing on the limited case law addressing
this problem to date, I have proposed analyzing such reliance claims
by balancing separation of powers concerns about unauthorized
executive suspensions of law against risks of confusion and
unfairness to particular individuals.
As a general matter, as courts have by and large recognized, this
balance should tilt in favor of enforcement. Protecting individual
reliance in all cases, or even when concerns about fair notice are
substantial, would undermine important legal limits on enforcement
officials’ authority by giving them effective power to authorize legal
violations. Nevertheless, in at least some situations—when the
government pursues violations despite authoritatively deeming
conduct lawful; when it relies on particular information obtained by
promising nonenforcement, or when it pursues violations prohibited
only as a secondary means of implementing unenforced primary
prohibitions; when Congress, rather than an enforcement agency
alone, has mandated nonenforcement; or when an overt
nonenforcement policy has persisted without revision or salient
violations for an extended period—the balance should tip the other
way and reliance defenses should hold broader scope. Even with
these doctrinal adjustments, however, future Presidents and
Congresses might give greater consideration to mitigating risks of
unfairness through means such as executive clemency, administra-
tive action, or substantive legislation that provide more durable
protection against future enforcement.
